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The thesis inquires into some rationales, historical and theoretical,
for a municipal role in the determination of land use. It is particularly
concerned with developing an understanding of municipal action as part of
a larger decision process. While the topic is nominally land use, the thesis
is as much concerned with the structuring of decision processes as it is
with the particular area of decision discussed.
The first part of the thesis deals with zoning as a modification of a
previously more privitized land use decision process. The first chapter
touches on the significance of zoning and questions the limits of land
use control. Is desirable land use the only permissible end of municipal
land use control powers, or are these powers available for implimenting
distinct policy objectives? Subsequent chapters discuss the historical
origins of the municipal role; a general conceptualization of the role of
the state in supervising and providing a backdrop for a privitized decision
process; and the theoretical arguments for the consitutionality of zoning,
relating them to the framework of privitized decision discussed earlier.
The second part of the thesis develops a model of individual inter-
action which does not rely on a dichotomy between individual and state,
and considers the usefulness of some goals offered by theorists for
restructuring land use decision processes. The discussion is concernaed
primarily with establishing the limited usefulness of the economic criteria
considered in light of the ill-defined nature of the distribution of the
objects of human desires. The concluding section suggests that a cost
internalization function may be discerned in parochial municipal land use
control measures.
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DESCRIPTION OF TOPIC
This thesis will discuss some rationales for the
municipal role in land use determination. This is of
necessity a discussion of techniques and policy, action
and motivation. Why were techniques created thought to
be appropriate? What rationales supported the need for
collective action? My inquiry has led me to question
whether in phrasing the last question I have not made
assumptions which may prove questionable. It presupposes
a norm of individualistic action from which departures
must be justified. While this notion retains for me much
intuitive appeal, it is considered and rejected. What is
meant by collective action in a society which proscribes
the use of force by one member against others to the ex-
tent ours does?
My topic materialized as an attempt to develop an
understanding of and attitude toward the land use control
techniques of Ramapo, New York and Petaluma, California.
Both are frank in announcing their intentions to further
certain parochial interests of the residents of the muni-
cipalities. They have been attacked for the harsh and
unfair impacts such plans will have on residents of neigh-
boring municipalities and would be settlers as well as
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particular landowners within the municipalities. However
neither of these techniques is dealt with explicitly.
Rather the discussion which has materialized is of a more
general nature, dealing with issues which might be
characterized as involved with a theory of government
which attempts to provide an approach to considering such
municipal land use control techniques.
This thesis is about the law, but it makes no attempt
to state the substance of existing rules. Rather it is
concerned with how the law structures the interactions of
individuals in society. While I wish to focus on the
municipal role in land use determination, my treatment
stumbles back and forth across a line between dealing with
the municipal role and its supporting rationales, and
dealing with a theory of government with municipal control
of land use a convenient example of an area of decision
making.
The topic is land use and the inquiry why control
at the municipal level, historically and theoretically?
It is hoped that the discussion of these questions will
form the basis for viewing the exercise of municipal land
use controls not in terms of a dichotomy between govern-
mental and private action, but with this distinction placed
in a position of reduced importance. A society with the
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intricate and pervasive interdependancies which character-
ize ours, cannot rely on a theory of government which
entrusts to each level only those decisions which have no
significant perceived impact on individuals who have not
participated in the decision process, and escalates the
consideration of each measure with broader impacts to a
level of government which can supposedly administer with
a view toward the totality of effects, without generating
uniformity in the quest for equality of opportunity. If
we are to maximize individual freedom and the range of
available choice, we must develop an attitude toward
political and private collective action which is not
sensitized simply to effects on those not party to the
decision process, but which links the level to which the
activities of individuals may be coordinated to the
values in the pursuit of which individuals attempt to
coordinate their activities.
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INTRODUCTION
The Context of the Municipal Role
Subject to the limitations of technology, or if one
prefers, the tacit conditional consent of the other forces
of nature, man controls the use of land. The process by
which land use is determined is one of choice and coercion,
involving directly and less directly varying numbers of
individuals in varying capacities. The individuals in-
volved change as they die, sell, fail to get reappointed
or reelected or simply lose interest. Tastes of those
involved change also. Processes of gathering information
about the desires of those involved vary considerably, as
does the process of molding from those desires a plan
of action. Individuals and collective entities are
constantly seeking to coordinate their activities and
improve the mechanisms for coordination. The entire
process is continuously evolving, with some changes
effected more consciously than others.
In the early decades of this century a very conscious
and significant change in this decision process spread
through many comunities in the United States. Municipal
governments, enabled by state legislatures began to plan
and to zone. Speaking loosely, planning was an information
gathering and analyzing process and zoning one of several
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techniques for implementing the conclusions of the planning
process. The zoning ordinance was a new rather direct
and coercive collective input into the process determining
land use.2 Its significance is considerable. While other
techniques for implementing planning decisions may have been
more important in the reshaping of America's large cities,
none has been as influential as zoning in the shaping of the
visage of suburbia.3 In addition to the effects on the
physical environment, it has had profound effects on the
distribution of the American population throughout that
environment.4
In the conflicts over the bounds of a municipality's
zoning power which have reached the courts, the interests
competing may appear to be those of landowners claiming
the right to put their land to the most profitable use,
those of other local residents who, through their planning
department, have expressed a desire to preserve small town
character or a level of residential amenity, and those of
would-be residents who wish to assure their privilege to
migrate and settle;5 but always implicit is the conflict,
involving what Professor Heymann calls social attributes. 6
Individuals are concerned not just about the resolution of
a particular dispute -- whether the land owned by the
Ambler Realty Co. will be developed for residential or
industrial use -- but about restructurings of the decision
process. Will subsequent competition between land owners'
- 9 -
expectations of financial gain and home owners' expecta-
tions of continued residential amenity be resolved in the
chamber of the municipal legislature, the offices of the
local realtors, or the courtroom? Each alternative
involves different social attributes: different patterns
of disalpointing expectations, different allocations of
effective decision making power, different incentives,
and different effects on the formation of values.
The Nature of the Municipal Role
The Supreme Court decision in Village of Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co.7 established that the delegation of the
zoning power by state legislatures to municipalities was
permitted. The municipal exercise of the zoning power
ipso facto neither deprives landowners of due process of
law, nor denies them equal protection of the law. The
decision made zoning a safe harbor. Municipalities which
anticipated land use conflicts accompanying growth in popu-
lation have been able and encouraged to employ a technique
which, although perhaps less than ideal in its allocation
of decision making power among interested parties, provides
a sure fire way of furnishing some measure of control
over what is often referred to as a "chaotic" process of
growth. The availability of such an acceptable alternative
- 10 -
of course discouraged experimentation with markedly
different alternatives, whose legality would be open to
challenge. Zoning, in modified form, has become an
almost universal tool of municipal government. While the
development of today's coercive non-compensatory techniques
for implementing municipal land use decisions has been
a step by step metamorphasis of zoning, they differ from
the paradigmatic zoning scheme upheld in the Euclid case in
many respects. They are vastly more detailed and more
flexible. The relationship of the restrictions to plan-
ning goals are often spelled out with logic more convincing
today. Yet in overall character they are just beginning to
break from the pattern typified by the Euclid scheme.
Rather than the placing of each parcel of land in one or
another category where various uses are proscribed uniform-
ly, or in modern versions permitted on detailed conditions,
it is standards which apply uniformly to all land within
the municipality which play the major role in implementing
the municipality's planning policy. The most well known
use of this type of technique is to control the timing of
development, a job for which 'static' zoning was poorly
suited. Where the Euclid technique attempts to classify
land into categories on a map which determine use, the
newer techniques enunciate criteria on which permission to
develop for a specified use is based. Pre-classification
- 11 -
of land, districting, the essence of zoning is dispensed
with.
The Relationship of Policy to Technique
City planning since its inception has had a special
concern for the physical environment. It is "the deter-
mination by public authority of the legal quality of land
areas for the purpose of adapting their use to community
needs."9 Is it a discipline whose purpose is to improve
the physical environment as something valued in its own
right, or is it the manipulation of the physical environ-
ment only the major tool in a process aimed directly
at furtherance of the general welfare? Must public action
in determining the physical environment be desirable as
fulfilling the tastes and desires of the community, or
may it be justified as instrumental in modifying tastes
and desires in the pursuit of a better society?
Little in the realm of human activity does not rather
directly involve the use of land. Always implicit in
the control of land use is the potential of controling,
of interfering with, almost any aspect of human endeavor.
In Kirsh Holding Company v. Borough of Manasquan,10 the
New Jersey Supreme Court struck down a zoning ordinance,
the admitted purpose of which was to control or prohibit
- 12 -
obnoxious behavior by preventing group rentals of cottages
by college students.
"...(T)he evil arises because of the offensive personal
behavior of many of these unrelated groups; group uses
by other unrelated segments of the summer resort popu-
lation present no problem. The practical difficulty
of applying land use regulation to prevent the evil is
found in the seeming inability to define the offending
groups precisely enough so as not to include innocuous
groups within the prohibition. ...
"...Ordinarily obnoxious personal behavior can best be
dealt with officially by vigorous and persistent
enforcement of general police power ordinances and
criminal statutes of the kind earlier referred to.
Zoning ordinances are not intended and cannot be
expected to cure or prevent most anti-social conduct
in dwelling situations...."11l
In Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas1 2 the Supreme
Court of the United States upheld the validity of a
village ordinance limiting land use to one-family dwellings,
where family was defined as traditional families and
groups of not more than two unrelated persons.
"... The police power is not confined to elimination
of filth, stench, and unhealthy places. It is ample
to lay out zones where family values, youth values,
and the blessings of quiet seclusion and clean air make
the area a sanctuary for people." 1 3
The environment which Mr. Justice Douglas describes
as one which a village may provide to its residents under
the police power is not one which could be easily under-
stood from a series of pictures of the village. The
environment he describes is a social environment, having
little to do with the objectively measurable physical
- 13 -
physical description of the village. The technique of
controlling land use here transcends the control of the
physical environment as an instrumental end in furthering
the general welfare. Physical form has become an index
for allowing selective control of behavior which has nothing
to do with physical form, and for selective control of
values. Whereas the Supreme Court of New Jersey found
the ordinance arbitrary in its classification because it
affected the rights of those whose conduct the statute
was not aimed at controlling, i.e. well-behaved groups,
the United States Supreme Court deemed the ordinance
permissible in proscribing residence by persons whose
values, manifested by their living situation, were
sufficiently offensive to the community that prevented
it from being their "sanctuary".
Once established as legitimate,techniques
become available for purposes other than those for which
they were originally intended. Although challenges may
consider and delimit permissible purposes, the technique
acquires a legitimacy of its own. As it becomes a fact
of life, part of a people's everyday assumption about
the structure of rights and the forms government action
may take, the burden of presenting a persuasive rationale
slowly shifts from those who support it, to those who
- 14 -
would eliminate it as a form of public action.
A technique, a concrete plan of action or restraint,
embodies the ideologies of its designers. It is the
synthesis of a consideration of values and the available
means for accomplishing desired results. Behind the
evolution of a technique like zoning lies a pattern of
changed dominant policies and theories. The beliefs of
Bassett, and Nolan, early advocates of city planning
and zoning, led them to design techniques which had as
"ends" qualities which are probably no longer understood
or valued in the same way today. Tastes have changed and
the theories relating these ends to the well-being of
the individuals who make up society have ceased to be
as persuasive.
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Footnotes to Introduction
1. Zoning was not without precedents, but the compre-
hensiveness of these ordinances and their new and
sudden popularity made them a new genre. Metzen-
baum, in Law of Zoning, notes that in an act
authorizing the erection of a powder house in
Boston in 1706 the storing of gunpowder elsewhere
in the community was banned; and that in 1692, the
building of wooden buildings was banned in Boston
as a fire prevetion measure. J. Metzenbaum, Law
of Zoning, Vol. 1, p. 5, 1-5 (2nd ed. 1955). How-
ever, note that neither measure attempted to
regulate land use differentially within the juris-
diction. Both are examples of legislative exercise
of the police power to define nuisances.
Zoning as we know it today, involving extensive
differences in regulation from district to district
within a jurisdiction, has less respectable ori-
gins: "Between 1870 and 1890 a good deal of San
Francisco's laundry was done in several hundred
Chinese establishments. ...
"With strong overtones of nativism, a line of
germinal lawsuits went to the tribunals of Calif-
ornia and into the Supreme Court of the United
States. Known whimsically as the 'Laundry Cases',
they often arose in San Francisco and typically
involved the imprisonment of a Chinese laundry
operator for violating local law regulating the
location of shops and prohibiting night work. ...
"The buildings were usually frame structures.
Upon that basis the City Council rested its use
of the police power, asserting that laundry regu-
lation was a form of fire prevention. 'The fact
thatthe laundry buildings were becoming the clubs
of the Chinese added to their objectional features
in the popular mind, and stirred the legislative
body to drastic action.'" S. Toll, Zoned America
27-29, (1969) quoting W.L. Pollard, "Outline of
the Law of Zoning in the United States", Part II,
Annals of the American Academy of Political and
Social Science, CLV (May 1931) ,at 18.
In Barbier v. Connoly 113 U.S. 27 (1885)
and Soon Hing v. Crowley 113 U.S. 703 (1885)
the United States Supreme Court upheld these
regulations.
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2. The plan itself, although officially adopted by
the legislative body of a municipality is without
legal effect and does not present a justiciable
controversy in its effect on the value of a land-
owner's parcel. Cochran v. Planning Board of City
of Summit 87 N.J. Super. 526, 210 A.2d 99 (1965).
3. See Toll, 193.
4. Woodroof, 1434.
5. See e.g. Hyson, A General Overview of the Conflicting
Interests Involved in Development and Environmental
Control, 19 Vill. L.R. (1974).
6. P. Heymann, The Problem of Coordination: Bargaining
and Rules, 86 Harv. L.R. 797, 862 (1973).
7. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
8. In Eubank v. City of Richmond 226 U.S. 137, 33 Sup.
Ct. 76, 57 L. Ed. 156 (1912) the court struck down
an ordinance allowing the owners of two-thirds of
the property abutting any street to determine a
minimum building line not less than five feet nor
more than thirty feet from the street line. Noting
that the court upheld an ordinance fifteen years
later in Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603, 47 Sup. Ct.
675, 71 L. Ed. 1228, 53 A.L.R. 1210 (1927) which
required a setback as great as that of 60 percent
of the existing houses on a block, Professor
Berger concludes that it was "blockfront democracy"
which troubled the court in Eubank. C. Berger,
Land Ownership and Use 637 (1968). Such precedents
do not invite innovative arrangements for making land
use decisions. See McBain, Law-Making by Property
Owners, XXXVI Political Science Quarterly 617
(1926) for a review of contemporary cases and reason-
ing with respect to the delegation of municipal
legislative function.
9. Basset, What is City Planning? 1 City Planning 61,
130 (1925); quoted in Haar, Land Use Planning, 2nd
ed. (1971) p. 52.
10. 59 N.J. 241, 281 A.2d 513 (1971).
11. Id. at 253-4.
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12. 416 U.S. 98; 94 Sup. Ct. 1536 (1974).
13. Id. at 9; 1541.
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ORIGINS OF THE MUNICIPAL ROLE IN THE DETERMINATION OF THE
USE OF PRIVATE LAND
The origins of the municipal role in the determination
of the use of privately owned land are entwined in the his-
tory of the rapid growth of large American cities around
the turn of the twentieth century and the following two
decades. The "city" was the focus of extensive criticism
and concern. More precisely, concern was expressed over
the corrupt government of cities, the poor quality of life
led by the poor of the cities, the unpleasant aesthetic
experience of touring the physical environment of the city --
which was obviously most poignant to those with more
highly refined sensibilities --,and the dangers to American
values and the American way of life accompanying the
continued existence of slums as breeding grounds for social
unrest and dissension.
"(The) period, from 1907 to 1927, ... has in some
respects a natural unity, and represents the rapid rise
and development of the present movement for city planning
in the United States."1 Introducing an assessment of the
progress of the City Planning Movement, John Nolen,
speaking to the 1927 National Conference on City Planning
attempted to present in capsule form an impression of the
conditions twenty years before. He continued:
- 19 -
"... In 1904 Lincoln Steffens published his 'Shame of
the Cities', with chapters on graft and corruption in
St. Louis, Minneapolis, Pittsburgh, Philadelphia,
Chicago and New York; and in 1906 his volume on 'The
Struggle for Self-Government', dedicated to the Czar of
Russia. About the same time appears 'The Battle with the
Slum', by Jacob Riis, and other books and articles dealing
with municipal reform. City government was at a low ebb,
but an awakening was in sight, preparing the way for
better local government and better planning."2
Among the diverse responses to these distinct but
related concerns was that of some architects and landscape
architects. Their approach was to treat the city as a
single project, to be dealt with in much the same way as
an architect designs a single building for a single client.
Needs were to be studied, a plan formulated, and the city
to be expanded, and as buildings wore out rebuilt, in
accordance with this comprehensive plan.
That it was municipal government who was to be
responsible for this process was initially probably less
of a conclusion than an assumption. The essence of city
planning was to plan each part in relation to the whole.
Only the collective body politic was in a position to
even consider such a notion.
The emphasis of the early city planners was on the
employment of expert advice. The authority to implement
the advice was necessary so that a small number of people
could review data to be gathered and arrive at a unified
- 20 -
comprehensive plan. Frank Williams opened "The Law of
City Planning and Zoning", written in 1922, with this
definition of City Planning: "City or town planning is the
guidance of the physical development of communities in
the attainment of unity in their construction. Wherever
in any locality a sufficient concentration of population
has occured to create complexity, here will be found a
network of interests, each seeking its expression in the
physical life of that locality; and it is the task of city
planning, either by prevention or by cure, to bring these
interests into harmony, in the unity of that locality." 3
Aubrey Tealdi, Professor of Landscape Design at the
University of Michigan writes in the introduction to
Williams' book:
"In general it may be said that in the earlier planning
reports the legal side of city planning was given little
or no consideration. The result was a failure, either
wholly or in part, to accomplish their purpose. This
failure was easily traceable to the lack of legal founda-
tion for carrying out the plans recommended in the
reports.... The need of a sound legal basis for city
planning in the United States soon became apparent. In
fact it did not seem an exaggeration to say that the
most important profession in connection with city planning
was the law, and that the lawyer, at least for the time
being, was the one most fundamentally concerned with its
progress."4
Thus, the focus of city planning was on the reshaping of
the urban physical environment. Securing an entity in the
position to do this only became a consideration when
- 21 -
experience demonstrated that the obvious client, the muni-
cipal government, might not be fully able to act in this
capacity.
The city considered as a whole was the object of the
planners' attentions. At that time the geographic boundaries
of municipal governments more adequately encompassed the
parts of the urban system to which attention was addressed.
To the extent that was not the case, the prevailing view
seemed to be that political integration was the natural and
inevitable solution. Writing in 1923, Professor Munro
states:
"...While, ... the great metropolitan community with its
concentric rings of industry and trade may be politically
a crazy-quilt of separate entities it is none the less a
single economic unit. ...
"...The social and economic homogeneity of the whole area
results in the creation of problems of a metropolitan
character with which the separate municipalities are
quite incompetent to grapple. ...Out of all this is sure
to arise, in due course, some movement for unification,
complete or partial, such as will ensure the broad
treatment of metropolitan problems by a centralized
authority. Such movements usually have an uphill road
to travel, for small communities are traditionally
averse to being swallowed up in larger aggregations, but
the propulsive forces are also strong and in most cases
some sort of metropolitan unity is only a matter of time.
Why planners continued to emphasize a municipal role
in planning instead of appealing to state governments with
more plenary powers is clear in light of the context of
the planning movement, the governmental reform movements
in progress at the same time. The planners' notions of new
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responsibilities for municipal governments nicely compli-
mented the municipal government reform movement's primary
concern for "good" -- i.e. not corrupt -- government.
Part of the context of governmental reform was the
Municipal Home Rule movement. According to Dillon's
Rule6 the grant of powers to municipalities by the sovereign
state was very strictly construed. Consequently each time
a municipality wished to deal with a new problem, a specific
grant of authority from the state legislature was deemed
necessary.7
"It may be true that the first attempts to secure legis-
lative intervention in the local affairs of our principal
cities were made by good citizens in the supposed interest
of reform and good government, and to counteract the
schemes of corrupt officials. The notion that legis-
lative control was the proper remedy was a serious
mistake. The corrupt cliques and rings thus sought to be
baffled were quick to perceive that in the bussiness of
procuring special laws concerning -local affairs, they
could easily outmatch the fitful and clumsy labors of
disinterested citizens. "8
McBain explains the municipal home rule movement, which
attempted to proscribe interference by state government in
local matters, as a response to this abuse. McGoldrick
focuses on corruption at the level of the state legislature:
"State control over cities, especially the state control
against which the home rule movement has been aimed, has
been administered by the enactment of legislation. State
administrative control is a much more recent development,
offering an entirely different set of problems. Legis-
lation, in legal contemplation, emanates from the entire
- 23 -
legislative machinery and speaks the will of the sover-
eign state. The reality is rather different. In the
case of a small city represented by a single legislator
in each house, what passes for the will of the entire
house is actually the will of the particular member.
His party colleagues stand ready not only to accept his
judgement as to all matters relating solely to his
district but to enact it into law. ...
"...Viewed in the light of actual legislative practice
the home rule movement is part of the broader movement
to liberate cities from organized corruption, and to
restore control to the so-called, or self-called, good
citizens. It is not concerned with a philosophy of local
autonomy in contradistinction to state control. ... "9
Whether municipal autonomy was valued in its own right, or
only as instrumental in reducing the corruption in govern-
ment generally, the thrust of the home rule movement was
to vest in municipalities sufficient general police power
to handle such problems as might arise -- precisely the
type of legal foundation on which power to plan could be
built.
The sympathetic relationship between the early planners
and the reformers who were centrally concerned with the
improvement of municipal government itself had even more
direct aspects. Especially in the early part of the
governmental reform movement, where the chief villain was
corruption, the development of bureaucracies with technical
skills to some extent limited the exercise of the discretion
of corrupt politicians. The fact that the experts, once
given authority tended to expand their influence provided
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for governmental action which, if not democratic in spirit,
at least was not patently corrupt.1 0
That architects and landscape architects value the
aesthetic experience of beholding well designed public
buildings and spaces surprises no one. But as it matured,
the focus of city planning shifted and was not even pri-
marily concerned with aesthetics valued in their own right.
"At first the movement in civic improvement was mainly
confined to the idea of the City Beautiful so that the
plans and reports dealt mostly with parks, civic centers
and other specialized features that made their appeal
through that idea, ... It was not until later that the
less showy but fundamental questions such as transporta-
tion, water supply, sewerage systems, etc., were taken
into consideration as essential parts of civic improve-
ment."ll
As the architect is concerned with firmness and commodity
in addition to delight, the city planners were concerned
with "(h)ow to relieve traffic congestion and increase
safety in city streets, how to relieve congested working
and living conditions, how to give city dwellers in office,
factory and home more sunlight and better air, how to pro-
vide a more favorable city environment for the rising
generation, how to reduce, by better city planning, some
of the 'tragedy of waste', which is estimated to be
about fifty per cent of the man power of the nation,
and how to control and regulate the size of cities and
- 25 -
provide a wiser method for the distribution of population," in addition to
"how to combine a new, modern, and appropriate beauty with American ideas
of efficiency, ... "12
Though their method was the manipulation of the superstructure of the city,
the early planners did not limit their concern to those qualities of physical
form which are desirable in their own right. They were responding to almost
all of the concerns that had been expressed about the city and its population.
With what has been described as "weak concatenations" of causal chains and
determining influences, the planners proposed to remedy perceived problems with
the urban population through manipulation of the form of the city. 13
"Among the efforts to environmentally improve the citizens of our cities
was the movement to depopulate the slum districts. The cities were awakening to
face the problem that good 'citizens are (their) best assets,' and were beginning
to accept that the slums were
prime creators of human wreckage. ... The city ... in condemning some,
marking others for extensive alteration and repairs, forcing out many families
because of overcrowding, (has) started a compulsory exodus where ... these
imigrants must live in some extent, as American citizens should ... removed
from the deadening, demoralizing influence of the district ... The struggle
to lift the level of the citizens
and 'the breeding of blooded citizens' had begun." 14
To the early planners, the public good which was to be served by zoning
was divorced from the felt needs of both urban property owners and dwellers
whose land and lives were to be regulated. The benefit was to redound to society
at large as a result of environmental determinism, through the improvement of
the citizen, not the fulfillment of his needs.
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Since planning and rehabilitation of a city is a serious matter, "it is best
that local prejudice not warp the judgment, nor familiarity dull the sense to
opportunities for change. For these reasons, the best results are obtained
from outside advice." 15 "Expert control and civic pride would both be the
guides to public ideals and desires. ... City planning meant a city built
by experts who visualize the complex life of a million people and who could
harness their dreams into intelligent and wisely directed projects." 16
The technique of zoning to control the use of private property was an
import from Germany, whose cities -- both governments and physical
features-- were highly admired by prominent planners at the time. In
An Introduction to City Planning, published in 1909, Benjamin Marsh
maintained:
"The most important part of City Planning, as far as the future health
of the city is concerned, is the districting of the city into zones or
districts in which buildings may be a certain number of stories or feet
in height and cover a specified proportion of the site, that is, the
determining of the cubage or volume of buildings .17
Here was a method for directing the future development of the city, for laying
out a plan in the form of a map and enforcing it. It offered a method for
controlling the density of population believed to be so dangerous to
the health and moral constitution of the urban dweller. In the search for
"attainment of unity in city construction" 18 here was, a way to exercise a
measure of control over privately held lands.
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As planners sought to achieve their goals, the political realities of
getting zoning adopted and upheld in the courts no doubt played their
parts in the development of the rationales for zoning.
New York city was the first to enact a "comprehensive" zoning scheme.
It was comprehensive both in that it regulated the permissible acticities
which could take place on parcels, segregating residential from industrial
and commercial uses, as well as the size and shape of buildings which
could be constructed, and in that it placed every parcel of land in the city
into one or another of the zones. Edward Bassett, appropriately termed
"dean of zoning" 1 9 played a central role in bringing to New York City the
benefits of comprehensive zoning, and continued to try to bring those
benefits to the rest of the nation. 2 0 His explanation to the Chicago
Real Estate Board of the success of New York City in bringing its private
property owners under regulation where Philadelphia had failed sheds
light on the influence of political necessity. It is summarized by Toll:
"(In Philadelphia) zoning was rejecte-d for lack of adequate preparation.
Unlike New York, where 'the people handled all of the zoning for the
city,' Philadelphia tried to legislate without taking the 'people' into
its confidence. .. . In contrast, the people of New York 'told the
Commission what to do. After the Commission had been instructed
by the people it was to a large extent the people's plan, and it went
through flying.' But in the final analysis Bassett was candid enough to
tell his Chicago audience just whom he meant by the people of Chicago.
'It is the practical people of this town that in the last resort are going
to say what ... (height) limit will be."' 21
Explaining zoning in a brief handbook writen in 1922, Bassett begins
by describing the "chaotic conditions in unzoned cities" illustrating that
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"the lack of regulation stimulated each owner to bu.Lld in the most hurtful
manner." After several more examples he concludes: "Not only were
private owners injured, but the city itself became less attractive to
industrial enterprises, business men and home owners." Several pages
later, discussing what zoning is and how it works, he states: "How
does zoning protect in actual practice? In general it stabilizes buildings
and values. Most of all it conserves for the future. ... "22
If the planners' values were paternalistic and their allegiance to class
interests sometimes difficult to discern in the early stages of the movement
when alliance with the housers emphasized concern for the poor qualities
of life in the tenements, the function of zoning was less ambiguously
stated by those who made it their business to promote it. 2 3
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22. Bassett, 321
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Autobiography: "During the next twenty years I visited every state
and all the large cities of the country. This work, however, was
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bodies, both state and city, assisted in drawing zoning ordinances
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test cases before appellate courts. From 1917 to 1927 I had about
all of this work that I could do and still have some time to spare for
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- 31 -
THE DETERMINATION OF LAND USE PRIOR TO ZONING
Law as the Structure of A Decision Process
The intention of this section is to sketch in very general terms a view
of areas of the law as the structure of a decision process; diffusely
allocating authority in some areas to private individuals, centralizing
authority in other cases in the courts, and in other circumstances in
other creatures of government. What is diffuse and what is centralized
is a function of perspective. From the global perspective of all land,
decision making in the case of privately owned land is very diffuse,
involving the interactions of numerous haphazardly related owners; and
in the case of publicly owned lands, centralized, typically involving
most directly the decisions of legislative or administrative bodies.
From the perspective of the single parcel, private ownership seems the
more centralized, involving typically one individual; and public
ownership more diffuse involving again a legislative body.
The analysis presented here is equally applicable to the current
structure of decision making, but the allocation of responsibility for land
use decisions has changed. The use of private property to allocate
decision making responsibility has been significantly de-emphasized
through avn increased reliance on detailed legislative and adminstrative
land use regulation.
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Prior to the advent of zoning, parcel specific land use decisions were
entrusted to individuals under the supervision of the courts. Courts
monitored the decision process through the application, upon the requests
of individuals with private grievances, of the law of property and nuisance.
The use of a parcel of land was in any given instance determined by the
unanimous agreement of the relatively small number of individuals who
"owned" the land. Entitlement to participate in this decision is based on
the law of property. In honoring the prior decisions of other individuals
and making the power of the state, through appeal to the courts, available
for the enforcment of these decisions, the law of property established
effective decision making power. By offering a standardized set of interests
consisting of rights, privileges, duties, powers, etc. with which individuals
had some degree of familiarity, it facilitated the delegation by owners of
decision making power without the necessity of forseeing, considering,
and bargaining over every conceivable eventuality. When conflicts over
land use arose between parties whose interests were established by
agreements, they could often be resolved by the courts by reference to
the agreements and to the doctrines of the law of property, which were
often deemed "intentions" of the parties inferred from the use of standardized
terms. The underlying theme of this area of the law was to lend the force
of law to the intentions of entitled parties, and to allow them to decide
how to use that which was their own. 1
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The privileges of private ownership, however, were not absolute.
"The law of nuisance plies between two antithetical extremes: The principle
that every person is entitled to use his property for any purpose that he
sees fit, and the opposing principle that everyone is bound to use his
property in such a manner as not to injure the property or rights of his
neighbor. ... The necessities of a social state, especially in a great
industrial community, compel the rule that no one has absolute freedom
in the use of his property, because he must be restrained in his use by the
existance of equal rights in his neighbor to the use of his property." 2
Nuisance covers two theoretically distinct areas of liability. Nuisance
itself is technically a type of injury. A public nuisance is an invasion
of the rights of the public at large, an act "which obstructs or causes
inconvenience or damage to the public in the exercise of rights common
to all Her Majesty's subjects." 3 Private nuisance is an unreasonable
interference with the use and enjoyment of land, i.e. an interference
with the rights that come from owning land.
Some aspects of the law of public nuisance have little to do with the
determination of land use. Like the ordinance of Belle Terre, discussed
earlier, they are primarily concerned with the regulation of permissible
activity generally, regardless of parcel specific factors. Houses of
prostitution exemplify this type of public nuisance. The injury to public
rights is simply through the knowledge that the activity is being carried
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on. An interference with a public right of way, on the other hand, typically
involves injury to the public by virtue of a physical condition. The public
rights in such a case have to do with the use of a particular parcel of land
and are intimately related to the situation of that parcel as a way of getting
from one place to another. This aspect of public nuisance law provides a
means for monitoring the use of privately owned land depending upon its
relationship to the use of nearby publicly owned lands. Although rules
determining the availability of damages in such cases of public nuisance
vary from those applicable in casesof private nuisance, the basis of
liability is very similar to that involved in private nuisance. The public
is the owner of land, the use of which is being unreasonably interfered
with.
Private nuisance is concerned with interferences in the use and enjoy-
ment of privately owned land. The right to be free from interference in
making use of land in a manner permitted by virtue of "owning" land
-- a complimentary set of rights without which the privileges of ownership
would be considerably less secure-- is implied to some extent in the title
which is the basis of the privileges. Such interference is caused, one may
presume, by some nearby activity, i.e. the use of neighboring land. Typical
private nuisances are unreasonable amounts of dense smoke, vibrations
in the earth, noise, or stench. The key requirement is unreasonableness.
Here again, an activity whose direct effect on the senses is not itself
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obnoxious may be a private nuisance. Funeral parlors are a common example.
Especially since subjectively understood interferences not accompanied
by palpably obvious affronts to the senses were protectable by the law of
nuisance, a means is necessary to effect the balancing described in the
lines from Anitonik v. Chamberlain quoted earlier. Just as the freedom to
use one' s property as one chooses is capable of leading to the destruction
of the value of other property, the prevention of interference, analytically
is capable of extension to proscribe any type of neighboring use. The law's
indispensable standard of last resort, reasonableness, provides this means.
Under this regime private interactions governed by the law of
property constitute the primary mechanism whereby society affirmatively
plans future land use. The plans that are made are the plans of individuals
within the limits of their entitlements, without significant collective or
representative input into the various bits of the highly diffuse decision
making that shaped the form of the city. To the extent that there was
"unity in the construction of cities" it was largely a result of Adam Smith's
invisible hand.
Nuisance law was available for the resolution of conflicts at the point
at which land users had suffered, or were clearly about to suffer, actual
injury. If he was sufficiently concerned, and unable to dissuade his
neighbor from continuing either informally or by purchasing a property
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right from him -- as a means of formalizing and perpetuating an agreed
resolution -- an individual could bring his claim before the courts and
have the question of each party's entitlement -- either to persist in
his disturbing activity or to be free from the other's continued
interference -- resolved.
The Collective Roles
In the preceding section it has been stressed that the most direct decisions
with respect to the use of land were made by owners. This goes on in a
context of collective decision making on issues of general applicability.
Here the collective role is examined in more detail and categorized. The
distinctions in roles, while analytically satisfying, do not represent
consistently separate functions of different government entities or even
different bodies of law. In any given act of a court or legislature one
may discern the performance of several roles, the importance of each being
a matter open to varying interpretations.
The state -- I am using the term generically, the distinctions between
levels of government not being relevant here -- oversees the largely
private process of determining which individuals will make land use
decisions. There are three aspects to this function. In all of them, collective
action influences, but does not directly decide how land is to be used.
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1. The state lends its force to the understood rights of private
landowners through a variety of judicially and legislatively perscribed
remedies, ultimately relying on the power of the state to confiscate
wealth and imprison individuals. This is perhaps the most basic and
necessary role. Without it one can hypothesize that there would exist an
anarchtic condition of decision making determined by force and manners.
But even then it seems one could conceptualize such a condition in terms
of smaller, less formalized "states" performing this role. Since the
state denies, under almost all circumstances, the use of force to its
citizens, it must perform this role.
It should be noted that although this role of enforcement may be
distinguished analytically from the definition of substantive rights and
privileges, when manners, moral compulsion, and social pressure prove
inadequate guardians of entitlements, actual alternative courses of
action are effectively delimited by the procedures available for
the enforcement of theoretically distinct substantive rights. Also, it seems
likely that in addition to being derived from understood entitlements,
these enforcement procedures, through the indirect means of affecting
the attitudes of individuals and becoming part of their subconscious
assumptions, influence the formulation of substantive entitlement.
2. It is the role of the state to clarify in the courts for individuals
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who feel unjustly treated the bounds of their entitlement. This includes
both clarifying who may exercise the rights of ownership, and what the
bounds of the rights of ownership in the particular case are. The former
corresponds more or less to areas of contract and property law, the latter
is shared with the law of nuisance, until recently classified most commonly
4
as tort law, where the focus is on the wrongfulness of conduct, rather than
the privileges of ownership.
Where the law is clear, and the parties require clarification only because
they have not had prior experience, this information distribution function
may be performed by lawyers, as well as by courts. The necessity of
resolving conflicts requires that entitlement in the particular case be
clarified even when the law was not previously resolved. The clarification
function thus blends with a definitional function. This incremental process
of defining rights for prospective purposes and general application through
the resolution of actual conflicts is perhaps the most fundamental principle
of the common law system. It represents a minimal redefinition of rights,
attempting to reverse prior decisions only in the rarest of circumstances
after a long incremental process of erosion. While the law clearly changes
by this process, the emphasis is on the definition of new law and clarification
of old only as required by existing ambiguity and irresolution.
3. In order to encourage individuals to make arrangements between
themselves, and to discourage arrangements which unduely inhibit subsequent
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rearrangement, the state redefines the ground rules of private property
which affect the ease with which control over the use of land can be
transfered. Since one of the purposes of the law of property is to give
certainty to the expectations of individuals regarding their control over
their wealth -- both as something valued in its own right and something
instrumental in encouraging the arrangement of mutually advantageous
agreements between individuals -- the redefining process tends not to
involve very radical change.
In 1285 in England, De Donis Conditionalibus, 13 Edw. I, c. 1
(Statute of Westminister) clarified the importance of the intensions of the
prior owner in determining the perogatives of the holder receiving his
interest from him:
"Wherefore our king, perceiving how necessary and expedient it should
be to provide remedy in the aforesaid cases, hath ordained, that the will
of the giver according to the form in the deed of gift manifestly expressed
shall be from henceforth observed, so that they to whom the land was
given under such condition (i.e. to the donee and the heirs of his body)
shall have no power to aliene the land so given, but that it shall remain
unto the isse of them to whom it was given after their death, or shall
revert unto the giver of his heirs if issue fail either by reason that there
is no issue at all, or if any any issue be, it fail by death, the heir of
such issue failing." 5
For the next two centuries, if at any point the owner of a parcel of land,
with proper language provided in the deed by which he transfered it, that
any who should come to own it could only transfer it to his issue (creating
a " fee tail") the land became inalienable , with the result that:
"Children grew disobedient when they knew they could not be set aside:
farmers were ousted of their leases made by tenants in tail; for,if such
leases had been valid, then under colour of long leases the issue might
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have been virtually disinherited: creditors were defrauded of their debts;
for, if tenant in tail could have charged his estate with their payment, he
might also have defeated his issue, by mortgaging it for as much as it was
worth: ... and treasons were encouraged; as estates tail were not liable to
forfeiture, longer than for the tenant's life. So that they were justly branded,
as the source of new contentions and mischiefs unknown to the common law;
and almost universally considered as the common grievance of the realm.
But as the nobility were always fond of this statute, because it preserved
their family estates from forfeitures, there was little hope of procuring
repeal by the legislature." 6
The redefinition of ground rules necessary to eliminate fee tail was
accomplished by a series of judicial interpretations of De Donis, and
ultimately by collusive litigation. 7
Delimiting the control that may be reatined by those alienating the
possession of land has been the continuing task of the revisors of property
law. Weighing against the desire to let owners exercise complete
"despotic dominion" is the importance of having this dominion exercised
by people in a position to be convinced to let someone else, who is willing
to pay, use the land. This aspect of the state's role is concerned not with
directly deciding how land is to be used, but with making sure that living
and identifiable people are in the position to decide.
The state also participates more directly in the determination of land
use. Whereas in the roles described above, the policy directing state
action might be seen as non-policy with respect to land use, leaving policy
decisions to the private sector, iti the following roles, state action must
be guided by specific intenilons about how land is to be used.
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4. The most obvious and direct way in which the state determines
land use is as landowner. It can and does participate in the marketplace
in much the same manner as private individuals. It buys land for public
buildings, parks, and roads, and exercise control over such land similar
to that exercised by private land owners.
Its perogatives exceed those of other particpants in the market place
in that while individuals can generally decide whether or not to sell to
an offering buyer 8 they can not decide not to sell to the state when it
insists on buying. Since the inability of the seller to refuse to sell deprives
him of anything with which to bargain, the fixing of the selling cost --
"just compensation" -- becomes a matter of impartial appraisal through
formal condemnation proceedings.
The state is limited in its exercise of the power of eminent domain by
the requirement that it can only take property for "public use." Writing in
1925 and arguing for the constitutionality of excess condemnation -- "taking
more property than is necessary for the precise, narrow purpose of the
public improvement" -- Young describes the state of the law regarding the
public use requirement, and quotes Lewis, Eminent Domain, 3rd. ed. section
257:
"The different views which have been taken of the words 'public use'
resolve themselves into two classes: one holding that there must be a
use, or a right of use, on the part of the public or some limited protion
of it; the other holding that they are equivalent to public benefit, utility
or advantage." 9
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Lewis favored the first view and Young, the second, which he argued was
becoming increasingly acceptable. The United States Supreme Court
decision in Berman v. Parker 1 0 in 1954 clarifies the correctness of Young's
predictions. The court upheld the exercise of eminent domain in urban
renewal projects, where the land was to be immediately resold for redevop-
ment. Clarifying that the power of the legislature extended beyond the
clearing of slums, and extended to planning the area as a whole so that
it would not revert to slums, the court stated: "Once the object is within
the authority of Congress, the right to realize it through the exercise of
eminent domain is clear. For the power of eminent domain is merely the
means to an end."
The restraint upon the use of the power of eminent domain -- which com-
bined with a power to raise revenues through taxing is capable of bringing
an unlimited amount of land under direct collective control, at least in
theory -- now stems largely from popular distaste for taxes. Especially
at the level of municipal government, where the relationship of public
expenditure to the need to raise taxes is fairly direct, popular sentiment
about the benefits of a proposed public improvement as compared to the
costs to be borne by the taxpayer, limits government from buying projects
that are not worth their price.
5. In particular, and limited situations, without interposing itself
as purchaser and reseller, the state provides some landowners with a power
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very similar to eminent domain. Although it is normally the right of each
owner of an interest in land to refuse to sell it, courts and legislatures
have provided remedieEs, either out of fairness to a landowner who is
severely hampered in the use and enjoyment of his property, or, from
a more global perspective, in the interest of fostering the allocation of
land resources to particular uses, which effectively force sale. This role
blends into the role described earlier, of attempting toassure, with no
particular policy objective, the free transferability of land. Where the
circumstances under which the remedy is available are very specific,
it may be viewed as an instrument of specific collective policy.
In "From Rural Enclosure to Re-Enclosure of Urban Land," Professor
Dunham discusses the history of the enclosure movement in England
"whereby rights in common in waste and arable land were cut off in
favor of ownership of separate parcels," "the mill acts in New England
and their descendants in the West with regard to roads, irrigation canals
and the like," and several other developments in the law. He explains
these developments as necessary to overcome strategic bargaining on the
part of private land owners. "It is believed that the essence of each of these
cases is that the land may be so situated towards other land as to create
a mutual dependence and a natural community and that, therefore, there
is a real risk of hold-out preventing the use of other land because of a
refusal to sell." 11
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6. The state also has the power to exercise some degree of control,
usually in the form of restraints, over the use of privately owned land
without acquiring and paying for a property interest. Under the police
power the state may undertake measures in the interest of promoting
public health, safety, morals, and general welfare. Distingusihing
between mere regulation and the taking of property, Williams in
Law of City Planning and Zoning explains:
"Regulation, if it is to have any effect at all, must necessarily deprive
the persons affected by it of personal and proprietary rights which, but
for the making of it they would lawfully enjoy. The United States
Constitution forbids the taking of property without compensation. Does it
therefore follow that the police power is superior to that Constitution?
Not at all. Legislation under the police power is invalid, which is
contrary not only to the fifth and fourteenth amendments of the Constitution,
but to the commerce clause, the clause forbidding the impairment of
contracts or any other constitutional provisions, or to state constitutions.
But constitutions are to be interpreted not only logically but in the light
of history and the common use of words. Governments always have
regulated and always must to some extent regulate without compensation
the relations of one individual to others. It is not to be supposed that the
makers of our Constitution intended to forbid such legislation." 12
Thus it appears that there are some privileges which may be associated
with ownership of land which, looking back on the state of affairs existing
prior to a new valid regulation, may be seen as a sort of second rate entitle-
ments, allowed to the owner of land by default on the part of the state to
exercise its power.
The situations in which state action framed in regulatory language is
most susceptible to challenge as a taking of property without just compen-
sation are those where there is a great discrepancy between the effect
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of the restriction on individuals affected generally and the complaining
individual, or where the complaintant is one of a very few individuals
affected. Where the impact of an ordinance is widespread and more or
less uniform , one may infer from its political acceptance that there
are benefits which redound to those affected, and in a sense compensate
them for their loss. Professor Michelman separates the question of
compensating affected individuals from that of the efficiency of state
action -- whether the gains to those benefited outweigh the losses to
those detrimentally affected -- and concludes that regulation should
be compensable where it would be inefficient not to compensate, i.e.
the administrative costs of processing claims is less than the "disillusion-
ment" costs of not doing so.13
In Berman v. Parker, discussed above, the Supreme Court, in considering
the powers of Congress with respect to the implimentation of urban renewal
plans in the District of Columbia, noted that Congress exercises over the
district the police power. The court's discussion seems to focus more on
the purposes which government exercising the police power may further,
rather than the bounds of the power. In this usage "police power" seems
coterminus with the power to govern. The term has also been used to refer
to the miscellaneous collection of government action -- regulations,
subsidies, licensing -- which do not involve the use of other specific
powers, such as taxation or eminent domain. Freund seems to use the
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term in this sense. Here he explains "the police power as a means of
furthering the public welfare:"
" In so far as the prosperity of the community rests upon the efforts
which each individual makes for himslef, and in so far as without security
of rights, free, fair and peaceful individual activity is impossible, justice
is one of the chief elements of public welfare. Criminal justice moreover
directly protects public or collective interests in important respects.
Custom and sense of propiety demand of the individual that he subordinate
and adapt the exercise of his rights to manifest social interests and
requirements, and the disregard of this obligation appears as a wrong.
Thus must of the self-evident limitations upon liberty and property in
the interest of peace, safety, health, order and morals are punishable
at common law as nuisances. ...
"But no community confines its care of the public welfare to the
enforcement of the principles of the common law. The state places its
corporate and proprietary resources at the disposal of the public by the
establishment of improvements and services of different kinds; and it
exercises its compulsory powers for the prevention and anticipation of
wrong by narrowing common law rights through conventional restraints and
positive regulations which are not confined to the prohibition of wrongful
acts. It is this latter kind of state control which constitutes the essence
of the police power. . . ." (emphasis in original) 14
Under the police power, some degree of collective decision making,
directly concerned with the use of land can be made. It is upon the
police power that the extensive controls which make up the present
municipal role are based.
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Footnotes to The Determination of Land Use Prior to Zoning
1. In "Dialogue on Private Property," 9 Rutgers Law Review 357 (1954)
at 372, Felix Cohen states: "(T)he existence of private property
represents in some ways a middle ground between the absence of
government and the complete determination of human activities by
government. I suppose that is really what Morris Cohen is driving
at when he talks about private property as a delegation of
sovereign power in certain limited areas. In those areas the gover-
ment doesn't make a final decision, but agrees to back up whatever
decision the so-called owner makes."
2. Antonik v. Chamberlain, 81 Ohio App. 465, 78 N E 2d 752 (1947),
quoted in Prosser and Wade, Cases and Materials on Torts.
3. Prosser and Wade, Cases and Materials on Torts, 5th ed. 1971,
pg. 653, quoting Stephen, General View of the Criminal Law of
England (1890) 105. Public nuisances were originally petty crimes.
Since 1536, an individual who has suffered special damage may
sue the actor in tort.
4. Dunham, From Rural Enclosure to Re-Enclosure of Urban Land,
35 N.Y.U. Law Review 1238 (1960)
5. Quoted in Berger, Land Ownership and Use (1968) 120
6. 2 Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 116 (1765),
quoted in Berger, op. ctt.
7. De Donis came to be deemed satisfied if other lands of equal value
were bequeathed to the heirs, and eventually by a court judgment
of equal value, whether or not collectible. See Berger, op. cit.,
for the collusive litigation scheme. He notes that the common
recovery scheme, as it was called, was so prcfitable for soliciters,
courts, and government officials, that De Donis was not repealed
legislatively until 1834.
8. See number 5 infra.
9. Young, City Planning and Restrictions on the Use of Property,
9 Minn. L. R. 518 (1925) 536.
10. 348 U.S. 26 (1954)
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13. See generally Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments
on the Ethical Foundation of" Just Compensation" Law, 80 Harv. L. R.
1165 (1967)
14. Freund, The Police Power (1904) section 8
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THE POWER TO ZONE:
Legal Rationale and Shift in Land Use Decision Process
To examine how zoning was described in arguing for its validity, I
will review an article by Alfred Bettman, a Cincinnati lawyer who was
active in the city planning movement. In addition to the fact that the
arguments are well stated, Bettman's possible role in the Euclid decision 2
makes the use of his article appropriate.
After introducing zoning as districting with uniform regulation within
districts, and varying regulation from district to district, and explaining
that it is the police power upon which the validity of zoning rests,
Bettman discusses some analogies, since "a new type or mode of
property regulation is not likely to sustain itself in the courts, unless it
can be shown to bear some analogy to recognized and sanctioned traditional
methods of regulation."
The first is the relationship of zoning to the law of nuisances, the
analogy heavily relied upon in the Euclid decision. Noting that nuisance
usually applies to those developments whose offensiveness is patently
obvious, he addresses the precepts and philosophy which he feels
underlie the case law. The philosophy is "nothing more or less than the
old adage that a man shall not so use his property as to injure another; and
the precept, that a man may not send noise or odor or other disturbing sub-
stance or vibration into or onto his neighbor's property." 3 Asserting that
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the law of nuisance operates by way of prevention as well as suppression,
he suggests that zoning shares many of the same purposes. It aims to
segregate "the noises odors and turmoils necessarily incident to the
operation of industry from those sections in which the homes of people
are or may be appropriately located.
Bettman chose conveniently the underlying principles which zoning has
in common with the common law of nuisance. Recalling the discussion of
nuisance in the preceding section, it should be clear that there are rather
importance differences in both the procedures of the system and the under-
lying philosophy. The interference which could be enjoined in a suit based
on nuisance had to be "unreasonable" and substantial, and the conflict be
between the parties ripe. This limited the applicability of nuisance
because courts were concerned not to allow the rights of landowners to
be unduly burdened by a sensitive or spiteful neighbor. Land was a subject
of special concern to the common law. Each parcel was recognized to be
unique, and there was special concern that an individual's range of discretion
in determining the use of his unique parcel be protected.
The presumption was that the owner of land was entitled to use it as
he saw fit. Nuisance was a way of policing uses of land which grossly
interfered with the actual use of neighboring parcels. If nuisance w as
available for preventitive purposes, it was only in the most generally and
obviously offensive cases, called nuisance per se. Basic to the philosophy
of nuisance was that each case was decided on the actual facts of an
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actual conflict. The fact that nuisance was a body of law administered by
the courts made it a fallback for the resolution of conflicting land uses
which owners could not resolve between themselves. It was a check upon
the decision of the individual landowner, policing unfairness in using
property to the detriment of another, not an attempt to supercede the
decisions of landowners. The focus of nuisance was the protection of
some benchmark of entitlement of the individual landowner, not the
coordination of development for the benefit of the community, somehow
distributed to the population at large.
The law of highway construction is Bettman's second analogy. He
suggest s that the "owner of a sky-scraper might, within the bounds of
reason, be held to contribute more than his fair share of street obstruction,
in the stream of pedestrians and vehicles which he draws to or pours out from
from his property. . . . Limitations of height or of other forms of buildings
intensity have an obvious relationship to freedom of movement on the
highway and to traffic control." The argument is that the legislative
body has determined that a level of freedom of movement in the street
is desirable and the method they have chosen to further this legitimate
public goal is reasonably related to it. They are the representative body
of the populus and are entrusted with the duty of looking after affairs which
cannot be addressed adequately with less coordinated an approach. The
emphasis is on the provision of a necessary service to be available to the
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public generally, a type of service which cannot be provided by a lesser
level of coordination among interested parties. The service is so widely
beneficial that substantially all the citizens of the municipality are interested.
Another of Bettman's analogies is "the recognized power to enforce
cooperation upon members of a group similarly situated, for the direct
benefit of all of the group, with indirect benefit to the general public.
In the case of a zone plan, each piece of property pays, in the form of
reasonable regulation of its use , for the protection which the plan gives
,6
to all property lying within the boundaries of the plan." The policy
here seems to be the coordination of action on the part of property owners
for there own benefit. The analogy in the case which Bettman cites is tax-
ation. Implicit is the argument that the general benefits of government
compensate for taxes. The theory was that zoning's imposed orderliness
would create value that would inure to property owners generally, unrelated
to the suppression of adjacent discordant uses.
While the analogy to nuisance, manifesting a concern for the presumed
appropriation of value or utility by the development of a different use by
a neighbor was perhaps the keystone of the zoning argument, Bettman was
careful to distinguish zoning from nuisance explicitly and argued that it
was the inadequacy of nuisance that necessitated zoning to deal with the
problems of municipal growth. His argument is simply that the definition of
what is and what is not a nuisance was inadequately specified by the case
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law. "A conscientious lawyer would hardly hazard a guess as to whether
his client' s proposed industry will or will not be called a nuisance. There
is something manifestly unfair in requiring the owner of an industry to
select and pay for his site, design his plant and even build, before he
can obtain any degree of assurance that he will be permitted to operate ." 7
His criticism is a fair one, but while arguing that a change in the law was
necessary, it does not support the conclusion that comprehensive planning
was mandated. The hypothetical goes somewhat far in that there are
alternatives open to such an entrepreneur which don't require such excessive
exposure. He can either buy a sufficient amount of surrounding land and
use it for purposes compatible with his potentially nuisance industry, or
he can make arrangements with the owners of the adjacent parcels, specifying
by contract, or the conveyance of a property interest, his right to operate
his plant.8 While the uncertainty as to whether he could operate his plant
without the consent of neighboring owners may somewhat complicate
such negotiations, it operates on both parties. The neighboring landowner
who one might assume would demand exorbitant amounts, must be wary
that if he demands too much, the entrepreneur by developing, and running
the risk of a nuisance suit, may shift to the neighbor the exposure of
having forsaken a lesser amount. Once the adjacent use is developed,
the neighbor must run the risk of further exposing himself by investing
in a nuisance suit.
In theory the zoning system has the benefit of reducing this uncertainty,
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but it can only do this by deciding th issue of who will be entitled to do
what ahead of time. This is clearly desirable in that less turns on the
decision when it is made well in advance of any investment in the developr-
ment of the properties, but at the same time, to the extent that this is
true, the decision maker is deprived of the benefits of a complete factual
pattern on which to base his decision. He must more or less arbitrarily
allocate to some owners the opportunity to build commercial development
and deny the opportunity to others nearby, just across the district line.
While zoning in advance of development -- assuming that the zoning is
not frequently changed, as became a serious a serious problem9 --
would have the advantage of reducing conflicting land uses, it gains this
only at the cost of deciding how land will be used will in advance of when
urban development has proceded to the point where land is about to be
developed, i.e. before there is the best information about what type of
uses the land will be demanded to house. To shift the mechanism for
conveying this demand information from market forces to political
expression in the form of zoning plans would require more of a shift in
the land use decision structure than was envisioned. This is something
planning was never really designed to do.
Recognizing that zoning must involve many instances of regulation which
appear rather arbitrary from the standpoint of reducing land use conflicts,
e.g. excluding the noiseless and odorless plant as well as the nuisance
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type, Bettman stressed that zoning rested on the police power, which
extended beyond the suppression of of nuisance-like interferences, and
extended to affirmatively promoting the general welfare:.
"The zone-plan's restriction of nuisance industries to designated districts
is not a suppression of nuisances, but it is part of a general constructive
plan whereby the territory of the city is allotted to different uses, in such
a way as to prevent or reduce the various types of wastes and disorders of
unplanned development, and to promote the conveniences, economies,
efficiencies, and amenities of the community which develops according to
a design." 1 0
Precisely what these conveniences, economies, efficiencies, and amenities
were, other than the reduction of nuisance like interference, he does not
describe in detail. Since the court's review of legislative exercise of the
police power is limited to ascertaining that the exercise is reasonably
related to some public purpose, perhaps this is appropriate. It does seem
clear that the regulation of land use could have an effect on such matters,
but Brettman does not suggest that it is necessary for the court to examine
a zoning ordinance to see whether it does. He argues that the reasonableness
of the regulation is to be inferred from the fact that the regulation is
comprehensive, both geographically and with respect to matters regulated.
The regulation of use in addition to height and bulk, it is argued, is
"more thorough, more scientific, and therefore, more reasonable than
any of these types of regulation applied alone !' Similarly, geographic
comprehensiveness is to insure that the zoning represents "the whole
community's plan, motivated by the desire for the promotion of the best
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possible districting of the whole territory for the benefit of all."' hn that
one of the concerns of a court, as mentioned earlier, is the abuse of
legislative powers for personal benefit of a stable majority, the districting
of the entire community tends to insure at least that all participants in
the legislative process are interested parties, and therefore that the
decision is likely to be the result of a bargaining process with all
geographic interests represented.
The reasonablenss of the zoning scheme is to be assessed from the
perspective of the entire city. The question is not whether the exclusion
of a particular use from a given lot is reasonable, but whether the ordinance
creates a reasonable districting of the whole city. Conceding that the
boundary lines may effect dissimilar treatment to otherwise very similar
parcels, Bettman stresses that " a certain degree of arbitrariness is
inherent in all law-made boundaries. . . . As zoning is regulation by
districts and not by individual pieces of property, the proper test of
equality is the general intelligence and fairness of the classification as
a whole, not an impossible and prohibitive identity of treatment of
individual lots of land." 12
Where such cases of seemingly avoidable arbitrariness arise, they are
to be handled by the Board of Zoning Appeals and Adjustments. This is
an administrative board designed to serve as a " safety valve" to eliminate
excessively harsh or arbitrary treatment. The separation of detailed case
by case treatment -- necessary from the standpoint of fairness -- from the
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legislative determination -- where case by case consideration would be
burdensome and suspect as an invitation to patronage and corruption --
leaves the legislative body to make more general, long term decisions.
The legislative role is a sort of re-definition of nuisance by broad
districts, with the Board of Adjustment relieving landowners from the
burdens of the restrictions in particular circumstances where fairness
dictates, e.g. where the regulations effectively deny the landowner
any profitable use of his land. In this respect zoning represents a reverse
of the nuisance based supervision of land use determination by private
landowners. To protect a landowner's neighbors, the use of his land is
clearly circumsribed unless fairness dictates that the restrictions be
removed. Under nuisance, restrictions were imposed on a case by case
basis, only as fairness dictated.
The analogy points out another difference. Zoning does not
merely shift entitlement between the parties and allow them to bargain
as they could before. The concern of the zoning scheme extends beyond
the mitigation in advance of land use conflict and aims to foster rationality
in the organization of the physical plan of the entire city. Therefore it is
only the Board of Adjustment that can grant waivers of the restrictions,
rather than the most directly interested parties, the neighboring landowners.
The zoning scheme removes from the sphere of private perogative a range
of decisionmaking and vests that power in the local legislature and
administrative body.
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It was the intention of the advocates of zoning that the legislatively
enactly plan remain essentially stable -- it could hardly provide security
and stability to property values and use if it did not. Board of Adjustment
waivers were to be rare, only in cases of exceptional hardship. It seems
clear that perma~e and generality in collective decision making have
not characterized the legislative and administrative zoni ng practice.
Aside from the problem of corrupt zoning offici als selling relief from
restrictions for their personal advantage, judging from the statistics on
13
early variance practice, the administrative officials viewed their role
as less constrained than that described by zoning's theoriticians. It seems
likely that administrative boards granted variances for lack of reasons not
to.
The need for flexibility has been a constant driving force in the evolution
of current municipal zoning schemes. The information available for making
decisions of the general type required of zoning ordinances has never been
adequate to make the number of cases requiring detailed special attention
insignificant. Devices like special use permits, floating zones, and
special use districts -- as well as frequent rezoning -- have marked the
evolution of the pre-determined, once and for all scheme envisioned by
zoning's theoreticians into a very particularized monitoring of development.
New York City has enacted, in response to specific development projects,
special legislation which enable its planning offices to bargain freely
with developers, trading additional bulk for public amenities or desired
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uses. In the words of Dan Tarlock, "zoning ha been transformed from a
technique to remedy a limited class of market defects to a potential
system of administrative allocation of land development opportunities." 14
While the intentions of zoning, whether or not realistically, extended
beyond the discordant adjacent land use market defect Tarlock refers to,
his conclusion about the role performed by zoning seems quite correct.
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GOALS IN DESIGNING A LAND USE DECISION PROCESS
This chapter is devoted to formulating a model of
human interaction which attempts to respond to the problem
which has been the motivation of this thesis: developing
criteria for arriving at an understanding of, and attitude
toward parochial land use control, i.e. municipal land use
measures which further interests of municipal residents
to the detriment of individuals outside of the municipal
decision process. Unlike the modelling presented earlier,
in the section on pre-zoning decision process, here the
distinction between state and individual action is not
of central concern and is disparaged in favor of a more
functionally oriented analysis. Municipalities have
both state-like and non-state-like attributes. They are
governmental entities, but to a very large extent subject
to control by state governments. Because the essence of
the inquiry is the extent to which municipalities should be
functionally sovereign, it seems necessary -- in hindsight,
in any case -- to take this functional approach.
I shall argue that the perception of extra-terri-
torial effects of municipal actions is only the beginning
of an analysis of the desirability of allowing municipalities
the prerogative exercised, and in itself does not argue
that the prerogative is undesirable. In order to discrim-
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inate between desirable and undesirable municipal privi-
leges, it becomes necessary to scrutinize both the motiva-
tion of the action and the pattern of effects that municipal
action of the type involved will have.
The model which I offer is derived from an economic
model, involving individual decision making as choice
among perceived alternatives based on the highest utility.
Because the model arose out of an investigation of other
economic models, I shall present it in that manner. I
shall not try to detail its assumptions, and limits, but
present it with the warning that it probably involves
subtle assumptions about motivation and cognitive processes,
the implications of which I myself am not fully aware.
The following discussion takes the form of a critique
of a model presented by Professor Ellickson. While I
reject the formal framework which he creates because I
find it unsatisfying in that it leaves no room for the
inquiry which is the central concern of the article, I
concur in his arguments about the type of concerns which
are involved. However, I see them as relevant to an issue
not explicitly raised in his model. A difference that I
think flows from treating these concerns in this context
is a shift in emphasis, highlighting the subjective and
alterable character of desirable courses of action, and
- 63 -
suggesting that involved in the ripening of restructuring
decisions is not simply a canvassing of existing taste, but
the formulation of attitude on the part of parties who see
themselves as disinterested or subject to conflicting
interests, and the modification of expectations.
Efficiency and Optimality
In an article advocating abandonment of primary
reliance on zoning and increased use of consentual arrange-
ments between neighboring land owners, improved nuisance
rules, and fines, Professor Ellickson defines the problem
of land use conflict as one of resource allocation. He
begins by noting that
"Economists assert that if the market remains free of
imperfections, market transactions will optimally
allocate scarce resources. They do not maintain that
the distribution of these optimally-allocated resources
among specific individuals will necessarily be just.
...According to this economic model, optimally effi-
cient patterns of city development would evolve naturally
if urban land development markets were to operate free
of imperfections; city planning or public land use
controls would only make matters worse from an efficiency
standpoint. "1
Ellickson then identifies as the major imperfection in
urban land markets "'externalities' or 'spillovers' --
that is, impacts on nonconsenting outsiders."2 Relying
again on welfare economists, he advocates that "harmful
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externalities be 'internalized' to eliminate excessive
amounts of nuisance activity. Internalization is said
to be accomplished through devices that force a nuisance-
maker to bear the true costs of his activity."3
Although this material is offered on a provisional
basis, and is to be examined in detail in the rest of
this section, it is worthy of note here that this explana-
tion of internalization is somewhat misleading -- or this
definition somewhat at odds with that used by economists.
To be "internal" a cost need not be borne by an individual
in the sense of paid for out of his pocket. Internal
refers to inclusion in the individual's economic decisions
with respect to how much of an activity, causing such a
cost to someone, to engage in. For this purpose, it is
sufficient if a cost is a clearly identified opportunity
cost, e.g., the loss of an opportunity to be paid for not
developing a parcel in such a way as to block a view
from a neighboring house.4
Ellickson continues:
"Internalization of harmful spillovers in land development
often requires some departure from what this article
calls a laissez-faire distribution of property rights,
an imaginary legal world where each land owner can
choose to pursue any activity within the boundaries of
his parcel without fear of liability to his neighbors
or government sanction." 5
He goes on to describe briefly a "spectrum of internaliza-
tion systems" in order of "increasing degree of collecti-
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vization of decision", ranging from manners through
definition and enforcement of nuisance rules, the imposi-
tion of taxes on specified activities, and the proscrip-
tion of specified activities, to the prescription of
activity. His order seems to follow not necessarily
increased collectivization of decision, -- for in even
the minimal "laissez-faire" property rights world that he
postulates, if unofficial use of force is proscribed, and
individuals effectively6 denied the right to interfere
with others' exercise of their rights, a fully collective
rights distributional decision has been made -- but to
the particularity or specificity of collective decision,
whether it distributes effectively narrow or wide ranges
of options to the individuals in society. Correlative
with the breadth of opportunities which fall within an
individual's prerogative, is the breadth of impacts which
may be perceived as harmful, that he must suffer. This
view of what Ellickson proposes as internalization systems
as alternative distributions of rights hopefully will
become clearer after the discussion of externalities,
7
considered later in this section.
In order to choose among the limitless array of
alternatives that could be constructed out of the parts
chosen from this spectrum, Ellickson offers as goals of
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the system to be constructed, efficiency and equity. He
explains efficiency as the minimization of nuisance costs --
the harmful effects of neighboring activity, prevention
costs -- the efforts by either the nuisance maker or
sufferer incurred in reducing the effect of the nuisance,
and administrative costs -- including both the private
and public costs of writing agreements and law, policing
arrangements, negotiating, etc. He has explicitly limited
his scope to harmful "externalities" and so deals with the
minimization of costs rather than the maximization of
benefits. While framed in different terms, his goal of
efficiency seems to be the same efficiency goal used by
economists.8 The definition given in that context is
useful to keep in mind, since it more explicitly ties the
notion of efficiency to the mechanism which defines
optimal resource allocation. A measure which reallocates
resources -- shifts around the use and enjoyment of goods
benefitting some individuals and perhaps harming others --
is defined as efficient if the benefits to those made
better off, measured in monetary terms, exceed the harm to
those made worse off. The concept of efficiency is closely
related to Pareto optimality. A reallocation of resources
is called a Pareto improvement if as a result of the
allocation, at least one individual is better off and no
one is worse off. One may infer that this is the case when
two individuals voluntarily trade services, items of wealth,
or rights, broadly conceived of as anything which they can
trade. They arrive at a price or bargain such that each
prefers what he will receive to what he gives up, other-
wise he would not trade. Note that there are circum-
stances where the form of this description seems to fit,
but we balk at calling an individual's participation volun-
tary, and do not view the result as particularly appealing.
When a robber points a gun and orders his victim to deliver
his money or lose his life, we described the victim's
compliance with the terms of the bargain -- abstention from
killing for money -- as coerced, not voluntary. If such a
bargain is not viewed as acceptable -- even desirable --
it is because it is outside of the model world of Pareto
improvements. The thief is attempting to sell something
he is not entitled to, the right to take the victim's life.
He is violating the distributional assumption of the model.
In a world where entitlement was distributed in another way,
this bargain might indeed represent the sort of "ethical
maximizing" that Pareto optimality evokes. If the nature
of our world was such that people were incapable of trading
anything they were not entitled to, all interactions would
involve Pareto improvements. The problem of divergence
- 6,7 -
- 68 -
between substantive entitlement and effective distribution
is a recurrent one to which we shall return. It is rare
in the economist's model that they are not assumed to be
the same.
Where members of society desire something held or
enjoyed by others, a change in the deployment of resources
which transfers the goods to them is deemed a Pareto-im-
provement only if the holders are fully compensated for
the relinquishment. Where they voluntarily trade, that
they are fully compensated is inferred from their volun-
tarism. The same transfer without any monetary payments
which may have been part of a negotiated bargain is deemed
efficient. Indeed any transfer which forms part of any
negotiated bargain -- remember that we infer from each
party's voluntarism that he values what he receives more
than what he gives up -- fulfills the efficiency criteria.
Efficiency, then, is a less demanding criterion than the
Pareto criterion. To satisfy it, it is not necessary to
identify all the recipients of both the costs and benefits
in order to be sure that there is no net loss to any
individual, as must be done to satisfy the Pareto criterion.
Taking wealth from some members of society and giving
it to others simply because they would be willing to pay,
without requiring actual payment, no doubt does not sit
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comfortably on one's moral consciousness. It seems to be
a widely held ethical assumption in our society that such
a policy should not be generally pursued. Compensation for
collectively imposed allocations is urged to the limits of
feasibility. 9
It warrants clarification that a uniform and strictly
applied compensation requirement -- were such a policy
technically possible -- though having an intuitive appeal,
is hardly a neutral ethical ideal. Exclusive use of the
Pareto criteria to decide what allocations may take place
would ascribe to the existing distribution of wealth among
individuals in society, in all its detail, an ethical
rightness which there seems no reason to so ascribe. The
distribution we find is the result of collective and pri-
vate actions in the past which have both re-distributed
and partially perpetuated the then existing distribution
in accordance with values and ethical beliefs not necessarily
embraced today.
The Nature of "Goods" and "Wealth"; What is Being Allocated
and Distributed
The resources, goods, or rights we are referring to
should be understood in a very broad sense. They are the
elements in an open ended collection including all the
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objects of human desires. The fact that ours is a four
dimensional world can create confusion in understanding
the character of shifts in the deployment of both tangible
goods and other perceived phenomena which are the source
of human well-being.
When an individual rents a house, it is understood
that in return for the payment of an agreed sum, he will
receive not the materials and land to do with as he pleases,
but the use of this tangible stuff over a specified period
with rather important requirements about what he must
return at the end of the period. He has acquired a complex
set of relationships to other individuals with respect
to the house. To the lessor he may owe the obligation not
to carry on any but specified activities within the house.
To visitors he may owe an obligation to keep the cellar
door firmly secured so that they do not injure themselves.
Precisely what, in hindsight, we may see that he has
acquired, depends to a very considerable extent on the
nature of future events. It depends on whether the house
burns down and on whether real estate values in the
neighborhood go up. In short, the things that we speak of
as being allocated are a collection of risks, contingent
obligations, and dependent privileges. The nature of this
spectrum of possibilities may be determined by agreement
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between the acquirer and prior owners, and by other more
general rules defining entitlement--law. The role of
"manners" is considered later.
When the deployment of tangible goods changes, one
may conceptualize the change in any of several ways.
Without calling into question distributional assumptions,
one may view a change as either allocation or the materiali-
zation of an event upon which prerogatives, obligations, or
enjoyment were dependent. While it is tempting to distin-
guish between a materialization and allocation on the
basis of intentional action on the part of an individual,
such a distinction can be slippery. The decision of a
third party might be a condition of the agreement, and so
seem more satisfactorily conceptualized as a materiali-
zation. A might enjoy the view over B's undeveloped
fields, which he is "entitled" to enjoy until B decides
to develop a house there. With respect to A's loss of
the view he enjoyed -- certainly a good within our broad
definition -- B's action seems more easily understandable
as a materialization than an allocation. Perhaps because
it only involved his unilateral action. Although B has
never exercised his prerogative to build a house, and
that had allowed A to enjoy a pastoral view, the prero-
gative was not newly acquired. When we consider that it
- 72 -
is within the existing entitlement of parties to trade
entitlements to some extent, the distinction between
materialization of events on which the current deployment
of resources was contingent and allocation fades entirely.
The distinction between redistribution -- transcending
the bounds of entitlement -- and allocation remains intact
for the moment, largely because we have not yet considered
how entitlement is defined. If entitlement is well-defined,
expressing definitely whether or not any conceivable action
is by entitlement, then the distinction between entitle-
ment and allocation/materialization is a firm one.
Perhaps this is made clearer by conceiving of all alloca-
tion as materialization. From this perspective, existing
distribution is left unchanged. This is to say that all
risks are distributed initially, and all future events are
simply the materialization of the existing risks.
What Costs Count
In both paradigms of decision making which satisfy the
Pareto criterion, voting with a unanimity requirement and
negotiated trading between individuals within larger groups,
the valuation of the effect on each participant -- what
he gives up and what he receives -- is by the participant.
It has been persuasively urged that this is the only
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reliable source of information on how the various individ-
uals value what they have or want, and that the employ-
ment of the market mechanism to make society's resource
allocation decisions is desirable in order to generate this
otherwise unavailable information.
Note however that in making decisions intended to be
accompanied by full compensation -- acting only in the
interest of optimizing allocation -- an administrative or
representative governmental agency -- some arm of govern-
ment other than a collection of the affected parties --
attempts to gather different information than that used by
individuals arranging their own affairs by mutual agreement.
With respect to these differences in information one might
deem bargaining between parties less collectivized decision
making than governmentally ordained allocation.
Consider for example a group of white residents of
a small apartment building considering jointly leasing a
vacant apartment from a private landlord to convert it
into a meeting and recreation room. In evaluating such a
scheme, one of the residents might welcome the conversion
not because he is interested in the use of the communal
facilities, but because he is concerned that the apartment
not be rented to black tenants. In arriving at arrangements
in private bargaining, all factors which people are con-
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cerned with are part of the utilitarian calculus, without
regard to the degree such factors are deemed legitimate
by the rest of society. In facing a similar decision, a
regulatory body with power to convert the use of the room
and raise the rents would not value the utility associated
with the risk of a black tenant moving in. In general
economists do not count what are called "interdependence
effects", the effects on individuals utility of changes
in another's state of affairs, the welfare effect from
jealousy, envy, spite, sympathy or vicarious pleasure.
These are additional examples of non recognized sources of
utility.
Is it because of the extreme difficulty of policing
action motivated by illegitimate concerns, especially
where legitimate preferences may explain activity also,
that we do not more rigorously attempt to prevent satis-
faction of these desires by private action; or is the
illegitimacy of some of these sources of utility less than
absolute, so that at some level of privacy, action based
on such considerations, if not encouraged, is condoned?
In Shelly v. Kraemerl2 the United States Supreme
Court held that State courts were barred by the Fourteenth
Amendment's guarantee that no state deprive its citizens
of equal protection of the laws, from granting injunctions
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enforcing racially restrictive covenants, agreements
between landowners in the form of property interests in
each others' land to the effect that none would sell to
non-whites. The court stated
"that the restrictive agreements standing alone cannot
be regarded as violative of any rights guaranteed to
petitioners by the Fourteenth Amendment. So long as
the purposes of these agreements are effectuated by
voluntary adherence to their terms, it would appear
clear that there has been no action by the state and
the provisions of the Amendment have not been violated.
But here there was more. These are cases in which
the purposes of the agreements were secured only by
judicial enforcement by state courts of the restric-
tive terms of the agreements. "
The court concluded that the action of state courts and
judicial officers was state action, and violative of the
Amendment.
"These are not cases, as has been suggested, in which
the States have merely abstained from action, leaving
private individuals free to impose such discriminations
as they see fit. Rather, these are cases in which
the States have made available to such individuals
the full coersive power of government to deny to
petitioners, on the grounds of race or color, the
enjoyment of property rights."
The distinction drawn by the court between voluntary
compliance with the restrictions and enforceability through
the process of the courts effectively reduces the level to
which parties voluntarily coming together to satisfy
their mutual desires to be free from the risk of having
a black neighbor, can coordinate their activities. It
does so without holding that their satisfaction from
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achieving in some measure their end is totally non-
cognizable; without holding that any action taken in
furtherance of that interest is impermissible. It is still
possible for such parties to employ devices which do not
involve reliance on judicial intervention to protect the
arrangements made. For instance it would seem that
neighbors could still come together at the time of the
sale of a house and outbid black would-be residents.
Societal concern with the particular source of
utility in this example, racial prejudice, has been enor-
mous. The very characterization of the fact that utility
is dependent upon race as "prejudice" rather than "taste"
indicates that the troublesome nature of the source of
utility is perceived. Today it is evident that a consensus
of society views the reduction in this prejudice as a
highly desirable change in tastes, to be affirmatively
cultivated, perhaps even a necessary change to avoid crisis.
In response to both the imminent threat to order and the
need to insure that the source of this threat is eroded,
rules going far past the 1948 Shelly v. Kraemer decision
1iaVe ILLade uLLLlLy bsCUd U1 ra eniel±.LC._y non-cognizabJ.Le Lin
a number of areas, i.e. decision based on this factor
impermissable.
What is it about this source of utility that makes
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it particularly troublesome? It is a response on the part
of prejudiced parties not to any discontinuable activity
of individuals, but to inherent attributes which do not
respond to the law of supply and demand. A black person
cannot be induced to abstain from being black in the
literal sense. That he can do so in a cultural sense is
perhaps one reason why discrimination based on cultural
attributes might be accorded a higher level of acceptability
or legitimacy, and so permissibly be the motivation of
more highly coordinated activity. A generalized preference
for more or less individuals of another race, because of
very basic, widely espoused principles of entitlement,
does not affect the production of the "good" which is
capable of satisfying the demand so made. In the case of
racial prejudice, the response of society in making "taste"
with respect to race a totally non-cognizable source of
well-being, and impermissable basis of decision might be
viewed as an alternative response to the problem of
scarcity and the desire to maximize human well-being.
Instead of altering the production of goods in response
Lu Las Lae, aii effort is eingI made to consciously alter
taste to conform more satisfactorily with an inalterable --
because of more basic tastes not subject to question --
supply of goods.
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But the special problems of race, its immutable char-
acter with respect to individuals, its irradicable nature
with respect to society, and the highly systematic response
to it of white society, are not present with respect to
most of the matters upon which utility is based in land
use decisions. The approach which I have suggested is
present in Shelly v. Kraemer would seem suitable to such
matters, when it is perceived that voluntary arrangements
in furtherance of legitimate goals results in impingement
on the enjoyment by others of other legitimate sources of
utility.
Another difference between the information used in
certrally determining allocation decisions, and that used
by parties in dealings among themselves, may arise from
uncertainty or varying estimation of entitlement. Here
the concern of private parties for what they may not be
entitled to is not itself illegitimate, but is not part
of the regulator's calculations because he is better in-
formed about the entitlement of each party.
Consider the conflict in Spur Industries, Inc. v.
Del E. Webb Development Co.13 A developer built a large
number of residential lots close to a cattle feed lot in
a previously primarily agricultural area. Some lots were
sold to buyers, many of whom did not realize how pervasive
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and offensive was the smell of the nearby feedlot. The
developer and feedlot operator, as is not surprising, were
unable to reach agreement whereby the feedlot operator
would cease to interfere with the enjoyment of residential
use of the lots, which were then selling very slowly. The
court's decision granted an injunction against the continued
operation of the feedlot and ordered that the developer pay
the feedlot operator damages caused by his development of
residential use nearby, i.e. the damages as a result of
having to move his business.
In the negotiations which might have gone on before
and in the course of the trial, the feedlot operator
probably assumed he was entitled to continue his operation
and so was unwilling to accept from the developer anything
less than the full value of moving -- including such
personal values as liking the locality for its proximity
to friends (a legitimate source of utility), and perhaps
even resentment toward the developer and new residents
for spoiling the countryside (an illegitimate source of
utility?). The developer may have assumed that the feed-
l~t operator was noti nt-itle tn make the use of his land
for residential purposes intolerable, and so was unwilling
to pay the value to him of being rid of the smell.
The court's resolution is like a forced sale of the
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right to continue operation of the feedlot. This is an
instance of the fifth type of collective role described
earlier, where the law seemingly goes beyond the defini-
tion of entitlement, and forces a sale. But perhaps it is
better to conceptualize this as a different, contingent
entitlement. Compare the result here to the contract law
doctrine that courts will not enforce "penalties" -- as
opposed to liquidated damage provisions -- for breach of
contract. The policy of the law of contract in this
respect is not to deter parties from breaching contracts
in all circumstances, but to require breaching parties to
compensate the other parties to their agreements. Thus
there will be no incentive to breach contracts except where
the remedy -- which we rather theoretically assume puts
the other party in as good a position as he would have
been in and so does him no damage -- is worth less to
the breachingparty than performance. Contracts broken
under these circumstances represent Pareto improvements
with the "benefit from trade" going to the breaching party.
The feedlot operator must be compensated for his losses
in being forced to move, but he may not bargain with the
developer and attempt to induce him to pay what it is
worth in increased land value to induce the operator to
abstain from operating the feedlot. Note that an injunction
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conditioned on the payment of damages would suffice to
accomplish this purpose. The case is complicated by the
suffering of the prior purchasers of lots, who were not
parties to the action. This might provide an explanation
of why the court's decree seems to order both the granting
of the injunction and the payment of damages, instead of
merely making the issuance of the injunction conditional
on the payment of damages. Possibly the developer is
forced to purchase the feedlot operator's move at a price
which results in a net loss to him and a windfall to
existing residents. This has some appeal if one assumes
that the developer sold the lots to the existing residents
for a price greater than what they would have been willing
to pay if fully informed about the disamenity of the feed-
lot.
The problem of mistaken assumption about entitlement
can of course involve mistake in the other direction, i.e.
one or more parties to an arrangement may assume that they
are entitled to less than they in fact are -- one might
wish to say would be, abandoning the assumption of pre-
determined entitlement. In such a case bargaining between
the parties is likely to be easy. Had the feedlot oper-
ator assumed that he was not entitled to be compensated
for having to close down his operation, while the developer
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believed that he was not entitled to force the feedlot
operator to move, it seems clear that both could have
come away happy from a negotiated settlement where the
developer paid the feedlot operator some amount ranging
from zero to the full loss entailed in moving the feedlot.
Externalities
With this understanding of the criteria by which
resource allocation is judged, and the suggestion that
entitled distribution is a pre-requisite to discussion of
resource allocation, let us take up the subject of external
effects. The inquiry here is twofold: what is an external
effect, and in what sense do external effects interfere
with "optimal" resource allocation? Externalities are of
interest because we are told -- over simplifying the
economic argument -- that if we internalize them, we will
improve resource allocation, which seems to be a desirable
thing to do. The second question will involve recalling
what is involved in internalizing, briefly discussed at
the beginning of this chapter.
Ellickson's definition of "spillovers" or "exter-
nalities" -- "impacts on nonconsenting outsiders" 1 4 --
while conveying much of what is meant, is broader than
that used by some economists. Consider for example the
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act of outbidding the other bidders at an auction. Had
each of the others not been out bid, he would have entered
into a voluntary transaction, which we can infer from his
voluntarism would have increased his well-being. Being
outbid, he has suffered a harmful impact from an outsider --
i.e., without agreement to suffer it -- in losing an
opportunity to improve his well-being. But here it is well
understood that it is within the set of entitled preroga-
tives of each participant in the auction to outbid the
others. This is the essential purpose of the auction. Being
outbid is the materialization of a risk borne by each of
the participants. It would not be possible to give each
participant the right to bid against the others without
subjecting each to the risk that he will be outbid. The
existence of a right on the part of a single bidder to
be the successful bidder, without in fact outbidding,
would be inconsistent with the nature of the rights we
generally understand the auctioneer to have.. He is the
sole party who, by not putting the item up for auction,
has the right not to be outbid.
Rights of first refusal, which allow a party to buy
from a seller at the highest bid made by a third party,
and options are types of rights not to be outbid
which exist in contexts other than auctions. They involve
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splitting up of the rights of ownership between the option
holder and the "owner" of the item. But no such rights
could exist in more than one person, without some rela-
tionship between the rights, subordinating one to the
other. A and B could not both have options to purchase
an item from C without in some way making one contingent on
the other. Consider what would result if we provisionally
gave a bidder at an auction the right not to be outbid.
He would probably bid very low since he would know that
he could not be outbid. He would then be in a position
to resell to another would-be bidder at a higher price.
If the holder of this right not to be outbid were artifi-
cially prevented from selling to a higher bidder, there
would indeed seem to be problems in resource allocation.
A Pareto improvement would be available in the form of
the transaction, and would be blocked by prevention of
the sale.
Note that in the case of an auction the impact on
outsiders is conveyed through the price of the article
being auctioned. Mishan gives as an example of an
adverse effect on outsiders, the switching of a number of
consumers from tea to coffee. Initially the market price
of coffee will rise, and that of tea will fall. Drinkers
of coffee will be worse off having to pay more, and
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drinkers of tea will be better off, paying less. Although
the change in taste of past tea consumers has unintended
effects on others, this is not the type of impact on
outsiders which involves non-optimal resource allocation,
because, as Mishan observes, "each general equilibrium
position meets the requirements of a Pareto optimum,
viz. one in which it is not possible to make one or more
persons better off without making at least one person
worse off."1 5
The impacts on nonconsenting outsiders which the
economist maintains may represent non-optimal allocation
of resources, do not operate through changes in the price
structure of goods and services which other buy. Such
impacts are entirely consistent with optimal resource
allocation as defined as taking advantage of all benefits
from trade (Pareto improvements). The existence of the
impacts that follow from change in taste, technological
changes, or changes in factor endowments, the shifting
of the market to a new equilibrium position, is simply a
reminder of the ubiquitous scarcity of resources which is
at the root of the need for allocation. That not all
desires can be satiated is the premise of economics.
The impacts on outsiders with which we might be
concerned then, axethose which operate directly and not
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through the mechanism of price structure, and those which
16
are not illegal and so are within the economic model.
An example of an external effect of this sort might be
the reduction in pleasure that a homeowner suffers from
his neighbor's practice of making fiberglass boats in
his backyard, a process which gives off pungent fumes and
at other times large quantities of dust.
When an impact is suffered by a nonconsenting outsider
through a change in the price structure, it is because
both the causer and the sufferer of the effect are com-
peting for the use of a resource. In the auction example
the competition for the resources is obvious. In the
coffee and tea example, the pricing mechanism works much
more indirectly, but what is involved is essentially
similar to an ongoing course of auctioning coffee and tea.
When the price of tea goes down, benefitting remaining
tea drinkers, it is because a number of traditionally
successful bidders for tea have withdrawn, rather than bid
successfully as was their prior practice.
The impacts which do not operate through the price
structure may also be viewed as instances of competition
for scarce resources. In the case of the homeowner who
is bothered by his neighbor's fiberglass boat building
hobby, there is competition for the use of the air which
blows across the homeowner's land. He wishes to "consume"
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it in the sense that he wishes to enjoy it free of noxious
smell and dust. His neighbor wishes to use it for the
disposal of the smell and dust, not readily disposable in
another manner. Likewise in the case of Sturges v.
Bridgman1 7 -- which has become a favorite fact pattern
for the exposition of externality theory -- where a doctor
objected that vibrations from the neighboring confectioner's
machines prevented the use of his newly constructed
consulting room, we can think of the earth as a resource
which the doctor wished to have free from other uses so
that he could have quiet and freedom from vibrations in
his consulting room, and which the confectioner wished to
use for the disposal of his vibrations. We noted that
where impacts on outsiders were effected through a change
in prices, they did not cause concern over the optimality
of resource allocation. Viewing these land use conflicts
as competition between would-be users for a scarce re-
source, one might question why such conflicts are not
resolvable through the pricing of the resource. It
appears that if it could be arranged that the resources
whose scarcity is the cause of the conflict -- seen as
an external effect -- could be priced, their existance
would not give rise to concern over the optimality of
resource allocation. Coase demonstrates this initially
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without conceptualizing the conflict between adjacent
landowners as one for a resource, the nature of which
is deduced from the conflict. He argues that harmful
effects are reciprocal in nature; that in preventing the
confectioner from "harming" the doctor, we are harming the
confectioner. Going through the necessary permutations
of initial assignments of rights, and values of being
allowed to hurt or being hurt, Coase demonstrates that
if bargaining is costless and each party behaves rationally,
in a world of certainty, the party to whom freedom from
harm is worth less will agree to allow the other to harm
him. Toward the end of his article he concludes:
"If factors of production are thought of as rights,
it becomes easier to understand that the right to do
something which has a harmful effect (such as the
creation of smoke, noise, smells, etc.) is also a
factor of production." 1 8
Why are these resources not priced, and what can
we conclude from the fact that they are not? The attri-
butesof the resources, and the pattern of entitlement
to them is at the heart of the problem. Since the
nature of the resources involved, i.e. rights, is that
they can be made conditional and dependent on any factor
which one can devise, what one views as the resourceand
so its natureis to a large extent dependent upon the
parameters which determine entitlement.
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Consider the resource demanded by both the doctor
and the confectioner. Neither can look to other suppliers
when they find that the other is also desirous of con-
suming what they have to share. Because each has made
an illiquid investment in the form of their apartments,
which is technologically linked to the ground in that
particular locale, only the right to control the condition
of the ground under and nearby their respective buildings
is capable of fulfilling their needs. Were they tenting,
the resource each would need might be the right to control
the condition of some ground on which they could locate,
and not necesarily the ground on which they were then
located. Dislike for the activity of moving as well as
technological factors contributes to the illiquidity of
their investments in the locations they now occupy. Due
to factors which make the location distinguishable from
others, being there may have value to both the doctor
and the confectioner. Thus to the extent that location
is not fungible each might have developed an attachment
to the peculiar attributes of that location.
The technological difficulty of objectively
measuring the quantity of vibrations to be emitted makes
formal contracting on such matters difficult. For an
owner of a parcel who is concluding an agreement which will
bind subsequent owners, or users, -- to the extent he
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is concerned about deriving value from his land by renting
it to others -- the difficulty of defining with precision
the nature of the restriction will increase the difficulty
of ascertaining its effect on the market value of the land.
In the case of the confectioner and doctor, the re-
source valued is adequately described as the condition
of the ground, or the right to vibrate. The doctor pro-
bably is not particularly concerned about his neighbor's
motivation for vibrating. Where the resource's value stems
from the desire of the would-be owner to employ it as a
factor of production, this is likely to be the case.
However, where the would-be user wishes to consume the
resource, i.e. derive utility directly from owning or
using it, it is possible that his utility will be dependent
upon the motivation of the actor, and not solely upon the
objectively measurable phenomenon.
One must also look at the pattern of entitlement to
the resource. Perhaps the most significant impediment to
the marketing of such a resource is the considerably
uncertainty each landowner would have as to what he and
the others have to sell or need to buy, the problem of
ill-defined entitlement, discussed earlier. In the
negotiations where the doctor is trying to buy a limitation
to a maximum noise level, each will need to estimate what
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level of noise would be a nuisance and so not permitted
even without an agreement restricting noise. If they are
negotiating in the face of an existing conflict, the
relevant deprivation that the confectioner must price is
the difference between what the doctor wants and what is
a nuisance, rather than the vibration he is causing now.
Optimistic estimation on the part of either party will
make reaching agreement impossible, since each will then
believe the other is making unreasonable demands. In such
circumstances, litigation to determine the rights of the
paties will be a necessary prerequisite to the eventual
resolution of whether the doctor will be able to induce
or compel the confectioner to discontinue his vibrating.
The pattern of entitlement itself, the number and
circumstances of the people having an entitled interest,
even where the entitlement itself is clear, may cause
considerable impediments to bargaining. Should the con-
fectioner have wished to assure, prior to moving into his
apartment that he would be free to vibrate, beyond what
he was permitted by virtue of his entitlement to occupy
the land, he would have had to contact not just one, but
all of his neighbors. Each would be in a monopoly posi-
tion, and could be quite obstinate in refusing to sell
such a right for any but an exorbitant cost, unrelated to
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what the right was worth to them unsold. This impediment
to trade arising out of strategic bargaining maneuvers
is referred to as the problem of "hold outs".
The above discussion suggests that there may be very
significant costs involved in transactions to allocate
a resource like that which both the confectioner and the
doctor are interested in using. The creation of a market
for a good is itself an activity which is not costless.
In order for individuals in the marketplace to bargain it
must appear likely to each of them that the benefits to
be obtained from trade will exceed the costs of bargaining.
It seems likely that there are many instances where an
omniscient observer of human affairs would perceive that
there exist potential benefits from trades; i.e. potential
Pareto improvements, which are not carried out, because
the costs involved in carrying out these trades
including the cost of finding out about them exceed
the benefits to be gained from them. 1 9 An alternate way
of viewing this phenomenon is to note that there are many
more potentially mutually beneficial trades than could
possibly be fully investigated, and therefore only those
which seem most profitable will be investigated.
The "externalities" which represent imperfections and
distort or prevent optimal resource allocation, are those
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where the cost of bargaining outweighs gains from trade.
Obviously there are informational problems in conducting
such analysis. Let us assume that the entitlement of each
party is well understood, and that the confectioner's
vibrations are not a nuisance, i.e. he is entitled to
continue to operate his machines. When we observe the
doctor simply tolerating this situation, we may infer that
in his estimation, the gains he could realize from a
negotiated resolution whereby the status quo was changed,
do not exceed the cost of negotiating. What we have
little information on is whether or not gains from trade
exist at all, apart from the costs involved in nego-
tiating. It is plausible that the cost to the confectioner
of reducing his output of vibrations exceeds what the
doctor would be willing to pay. Under such circumstances,
where no Pareto improvement is possible, the allocation of
resources is optimal. If the result of the doctor not
being able to use his consulting room is unsatisfying, it
is either because one is dissatisfied with the distribution
-- that the noise was not a nuisance -- or one is moved by
ubiquitous scarcity; here is the poignant form of the lack
of adequate information that allowed the parties to become
exposed to the risk that they would each need a resource
which only one could have.
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Consider the case where a Pareto improvement would be
possible but for the costs of bargaining. Such externali-
ties distort "optimal" resource allocation only in a
rather special -- and perhaps misleading -- sense of the
term optimal. Costs of bargaining are not less "real"
costs than others. Thus potential Pareto improvements
unrealized because the costs of trade outweigh the
benefits theoretically available, are perfectly consistent
with optimal resource allocation which recognized all
real costs. It is only in the sense of optimal which
ignores these costs of bargaining that externalities
distort optimal resource allocation. 2 0
Internalization of "harmful impacts on nonconsenting
outsiders" may always be accomplished through bargaining
whereby parties agree to re-define their mutual prero-
gatives. Recall the discussion of internalization at the
beginning of this chapter. The initiation of negotiations
between the parties interested in the resource makes the
cost internal to the actor's economic decision whether or
not to engage in the activity. It is where the anticipated
costs of bargaining outweigh the perceived benefits from
trade that external effects remain "external", but this
does not prove they distort optimal resource allocation.
Let us return to Ellickson's spectrum of internaliza-
- 95 -
tion systems and examine them in light of this view of
externalities: instances of the non-existance of a market
in a scarce good. It is particularly where the signifi-
cance of the impact -- the disutility from not having the
good -- and the very large transactions costs which
would be involved in effecting an agreed trade, support
an inference that significant gains from trade might be
available but for these transactions costs, that exter-
nalities give rise to concern. When we collectively
change the definition of entitlement -- transfer without
compensation -- we may be able to effect an efficient
transfer, but this will only be satisfying to the extent
that the prior distribution was without conviction.
When a charge is associated with an act, e.g. a fee
for building beyond a specified ratio of bulk to land
area, the harmful effects which are associated with exces-
sive density will be reduced, as a result of the disincen-
tive. But while the tax effectively requires the would-be
bulk developer to purchase the rights infringed by his
extra bulk, and so creates a market in the goods, entitle-
ment with respect to the right to build bulk is reversed.
Whereas before, each landowner was permitted to build, -- it
was part of the package of rights associated with owning
land -- the tax effectively appropriates the right to
build for the city, and requires the land owner to buy it
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back. An incentive scheme which gave the developer who
abstained from building excessive bulk would leave the
structure of entitlement more intact. Such a scheme,
linking the incentive to the coercive revenue raising
mechanism of the state, would effectively require citizens
to buy the right to build bulk from those developers who
abstained. Involved in the tax on building and bonus
for abstention, are forced sale and forced purchase
respectively. Because it was the bargaining costs involved
in negotiating with excessive numbers of people that were
responsible for making the good an "externality" this is
almost mandated by any entitlement redefinition that is
aimed at creating a market in the good. In either case,
the market exists between the agent of the public and
the developer.
The use of the efficiency criteria, rather than the
Pareto criteria, to override "entitled" allocative pro-
cesses where the costs of bargaining or otherwise compen-
sating outweigh benefits from trade, denies the entitlement
premise upon which it is based. When the intent is only
to perfect allocation, the efficiency criterion is
inconsistent. It redistributes so that the allocation of
resources before and after the transfers involved are
not comparable under the Pareto criteria. Each may be
optimal, but they are based on different premises. As
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a criterion for modifying distribution, the efficiency
criterion alone is clearly inadequate. Recall the
earlier discussion at the beginning of this chapter.
Perhaps the most important contribution that could be
made to reduce bargaining cost without modifying entitle-
ment would be the clarification of entitlement. The
consideration of the impediments to bargaining caused by
uncertainty as to entitlement suggests that the design of
procedures which narrow the gap between what individuals
may effectively do, for lack of sufficiently inexpensive
remedies available to those whose entitlement is thereby
infringed, and must suffer, for the same reasons, and
what these rights are "supposed" to be, might be an
important contribution to reducing costs of bargaining,
and so improving resource allocation. Whether the desir-
ability of narrowing this gap between effective distribu-
tion and substantive entitlement for the reasons mentioned
here outweigh the other considerations involved in the
definition of entitlement is not clear, however.
Equity
Ellickson notes that his goal of equity is somewhat
of a complication. He proposes to use a standard of
fairness which Professor Michelman derives from Rawl's
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second principle in A Theory of Justice. Michelman
suggests that a measure is fair, even when it imposes on
an individual uncompensated short term losses, where such
an individual should be able to see that, viewed as part
of a continuing program of collectively imposed realloca-
tions, he will benefit in the long run; i.e. he will bene-
fit more from the rest of the program than he will lose
from this measure.
In effect, this formula re-attaches to the concept
of efficiency the compensation requirement of the Pareto
criterion. Rather than requiring that each small loss
must be c:ompensated, it must appear likely that the indivi-
dual suffering a current loss will be compensated at a
later time by some measure which will impose uncompensated
losses on someone else. It is as though the sufferer
is given a hypothetical choice of calling off the govern-
ment action which imposes the loss on him, but only at
the cost of calling off all subsequent (and prior? from
which he has already received a benefit?) government action
which will impose similar losses on others and benefit him.
If he would elect to bear the loss now rather than forsake
the benefits later, then the loss is fair, or in Michelman's
context, it is just not to compensate the loser for a taking
of property.
This notion of equity is useful under a conception of
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collective action as intervention in the ongoing voluntary
bargaining allocation process, where distributional
considerations are not involved, i.e. where existing
distribution is not to be disturbed. But it leaves the
question of definition entitlement unanswered. Where
entitlement is well and satisfactorily defined, the
attachment of the probably-will-be-or-has-been-compensated
requirement to collectively imposed allocations which are
necessitated by impediments to bargaining, is satisfying,
but query whether what is involved in such cases isn't
more satisfactorily conceptualized as the definition or
clarification of entitlement, rather than an allocation
with nebulous compensation. Perhaps "compensation" is
best reserved to refer to that which is received in return
for what is given up voluntarily. Recall the discussion
of Spur Industries, Inc. v. Del E. Webb Development Co., and
forced sale of right to operate feed lot.
The Definition of Entitlement
The thoughts presented in this section form the link
between the motivation of the thesis -- the desire to form
an attitude toward the phenomenon of parochial land use
control -- and the rather abstract modelling of the
previous sections.
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The word entitlement was chosen to describe one of
the parts of the model because of its connotations of
subjective moral judgement. While the equity criteria
discussed above seemed to rely on "value-free" judgements,
when the model is modified to emphasize the importance of
the distribution assumption, the role of moral and value-
laden judgement becomes clearer. Implicit in this state-
ment is the recognition of a positive state, i.e. that
property exists by virtue of the continuous reaffirmation
of previous judgements; that distribution is not passive
and re-distribution active, but that both are active.
The analysis thus far has involved a distinction,
which, though particularly useful in some contexts, e.g.
theft and other non-entitled real action, has its limi-
tations. To what extent does the distinction between
entitled distribution and effective distribution fade when
it comes to matters like aesthetic nuisance, or other land
use control conflicts which involve definition of rights
which can command no overwhelming consensus of deeply felt
support? If we maintain the assumption that the definition
of entitlement pre-exists the type of conflict which arose
in Spur Industries, Inc. v. Del E. Webb Development Co.
and Sturges v. Bridgman, it seems clear that procedures
which can provide the parties with this information early
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on, at low cost, will improve decision making by them,
and reduce the formation of conflicting expectations. But
is it meaningful to speak of entitlement in such a case
as if it were pre-existing? It seems that it is the process
of resolving conflict, whereby the parties are finally
informed of their entitlements, that also defines them for
the first time. Viewed from this perspective, the dis-
tinction between substantive entitlement and effective
distribution becomes one between subjective, individually
perceived "right" and objective reality -- what in fact
happens, what one can "get away with".
Ultimately the definition of entitlement is effected
implicitly through the totality of social actions. Entitle-
ment, in the sense of subjective entitlement, can only be
a personal, individually perceived phenomenon, of varying
consensus. It is likely to vary from individual to
individual. Although each will probably deem it of impor-
tance that others feel an action or right is entitled or
not, his decision is personal. If one accepts this
assertion of self-determination, which seems workable at
the level of concrete policy formulation I am primarily
interested in, it follows that complete a priori defini-
tion of entitlement is impossible. While certainty of
entitlement is a major objective in institutionalizing
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the entitlement defining process, other fairness related
notions are involved. What is possible, and does exist,
are widely held estimations of high probability of certain
individual and institutional responses. It is upon these
generally held estimatioS that we are accustomed to rely.
The definition of entitlement, then, is an ongoing
process which involves the formation of individual moral
judgements on the part of members of society and the
progressive reification of these judgements into substantive
rules of entitlement, and procedural institutions for the
effectuation of these rights. Entitlement, to my mind,
takes the form of entitlement to certain substantive rights
and entitlement to have disputes with respect to these sub-
stantive rights resolved through particular mechanisms.
Recall Ellickson's suggestion that manners are an
available system of internalizing internal effects. It
seems clear that one of the reasons people abstain from
many potential interferences with others is what we might
loosely call manners. To some extent what is involved is
the recognition that this abstention from interference
will engender similar responses from others, and that
measured in terms of future abstention on the part of
others from nuisance activity which would bother the actor,
abstention now pays off. But this logic would seem to
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contribute more to an explanation of the formation of
manners generally, rather than to explain specific deci-
sions about whether or not to impose upon others. Argu-
ably it is the absence of a current decision which leads
one to characterize the abstention as based on manners.
Manners, a habit of mind which may be based on indoctrina-
tion in the above argument, are themselves responsible
for impacts on the abstainer. I suggest that manners
inhere both in habit which makes people not even consider
classes of activities which would offend others -- which
would mean that tastes are sufficiently complimentary that
no competition for scarce resources arises -- and in
vicarious utility losses which arise simply from knowing
that one has caused or is about to cause discomfort to
others. This loss of utility, regret or guilt, is entirely
separate and distinct from the loss of the nuisance
sufferer. It is a sympathetic interdependency effect which
tends to reinforce existing formal rules of entitlement
and, I submit, is part of the reification mechanism by
which rules of entitlement are formalized. Manners play
a large part in determining effective distribution,
especially with respect to minor every day annoyances, but
they are an aspect of taste, and not a mechanism for
internalization.
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Given this view of the process which determines
entitlement, one can point to a number of considerations
which a thoughtful individual might consider in arriving
at a conclusion, either personally, or in the capacity of
participant in one of the institutions which formalize
rules of entitlement. Felix Cohen concludes his discussion
of the origins of property rules as follows:
C. Could we sum up this situation, then, by saying
that this particular rule of property law that the
owner of the mare owns the offspring has appealed to
many different societies across hundreds of generations
because this rule contributes to the economy by
attaching a reward to planned production; is simply,
certain, and economical to administer; fits in with
existing human and animal habits and forces; and
appeals to the sense of fairness of human beings in
many places and generations?
F. I think that summarizes the relevant factors.
C. And would you expect that similar social con-
siderations might lead to the development of
other rules of property law, and that where these
various considerations of productivity, certainty,
enforceability, and fairness point in divergent direc-
tions instead of converging on a single solution, we
might find more controversial problems of private
ownership?2 1
When one is considering structure of a decision
process, similar considerations are present. In consid-
ering how much discretion should be vested in officials
acting in the public interest, one must weigh the reduction
in bargaining costs that come from concentrated authority
against the poorer valuation information that accompanies
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the concentration of power in one individual to affect
the welfare of many.
In determining when entitlement definition decisions
will be formalized, one must weigh against the desirability
of certainty, and the prevention of illiquid investments
in wrong speculation -- as might have been the case in
Sturges v. Bridgman -- the desirability of making entitle-
ment contingent on specific factors which defy advance
classification.
More than this cursory suggestion of what is involved
in a consideration of decision restructuring alternatives
is beyond the scope of what can be handled here. In the
following section I consider the desirability of entitle-
ment to coordinate land use through the mechanism of
municipal government in cases where there is a significant
perceived impact on individuals outside of the municipality.
The Ellickson article is concerned with alternative decision
processes concerning matters not perceived as significantly
affecting persons beyond municipal borders, and I will not
attempt to summarize the thoughtful analysis presented
there.
Parochialism as Internalization
The problem of municipal parochialism is analytically
somewhat similar to the problem of "externalities" between
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adjacent landowners. It is now municipalities which in
comprehensively regulating their own land affect the use
and enjoyment of land outside their borders and the op-
tions of non-residents to settle within municipal borders.
It appears that there is no smoothly functioning inter-
municipal market in land use regulation. Perhaps even the
suggestion that such a market is desirable is counter-
intuitive, but in a sense it exists in the form of higher
levels of political organization. I will suggest that a
marketing function may also be discerned in the inter-
actions between municipalities and would-be land users.
In the following pages I will suggest that a municipal
role in comprehensively regulating land use may perform
the function of providing a market for environmental
amenity. Ellickson would call this a cost internalization
function. By allowing municipalities to exercise a
sufficient level of centralized land use control, the
strategic bargaining problems, costs of dealing with large
numbers of decision making parties, and problems of
uncertainty with respect to entitlement, may be sufficiently
reduced that the benefits from trading in the good of
environmental amenity may outweigh the costs.
Monitoring municipal action in the interest of
protecting municipal citizens presents distinctly differ-
ent problems from monitoring in order to protect the
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interests of people outside the municipality. With
respect to municipal residents, the question, assuming
that municipal action is efficient -- i.e. counting costs
to municipal residents only -- is, are the benefits
reasonably well distributed? Is the Michelman standard of
fairness fulfilled? To the extent one is dissatisfied
with the criterion of efficiency as a ground for munici-
pal action the question of the extent to which municipal-
ities can determine entitlement is raised instead.
With respect to individuals outside of the municipality
the question raised is the extent to which action by the
municipality infringes on the entitlements of those outside
the municipal borders. As the Shelly v. Kraemer indicates,
coordination of individuals which does not exceed the
bounds of the entitlement of each acting individually and
does not unduly infringe the rights of the participants,
may give rise to concern about the interests of outsiders.
In light of the understanding of entitlement developed
earlier, it seems clear that there exists some measure
of entitled discretion at the level of coordination of
municipality. Recalling the Belle-Terre and Kisch Holding
Company cases discussed in the introduction, it should be
clear that no blanket, formalistic solution is available.
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In Duffcon Concrete Products v. Borough of Creskill 2 2
the court upheld the municipality's exclusion of a concrete
plant. This municipal action affected significantly the
relative well-being of many of the people within the bounds
of Cresskill. The landowner who would have sold his parcel
to the concrete plant was no doubt worse off. The adjacent
landowners were probably better off, certainly if they
were residential users. Residents of the municipality
far from the plant might have been worse off. Had the
plant located there, tax revenues from the plant might
have decreased the tax demands on their property or in-
creased the level of municipal services without raising
taxes. The problems of fairness and legitimacy in the
making of decisions with so many conflicting interests has
been touched on earlier and is not considered here. I
shall assume that from the perspective of these participants,
the municipal role in making such decisions is acceptable.
The reasoning of the Michelman fairness test seems readily
applicable.
Cresskill having rejected the concrete plant, one is
tempted to conclude that the plant is "forced" onto some
neighboring municipality. But if so, perhaps it is with
notice that the plant may be excluded if the municipality
so desires. The municipality accepting the concrete plant
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might do so because it is able to extract sufficient com-
pensation for the loss of environmental amenity, by way
of increased taxes, free concrete, or special landscaping,
to make the location of the plant there desirable. If
this is the case, the price of concrete will reflect
these demands, and through the marketing of concrete,
concrete products, and the services of the users of con-
crete products, this cost will be transferred to those
people for whom concrete is produced.
If the plant is excluded everywhere, it is because
the users of concrete will seek substitutes rather than
pay the increased costs resulting from the necessity of
compensating the municipal host for the environmental
disamenities of the plant. Involved in allowing this
municipal power to exclude, broadly conceived as a power
to bargain and sell the right to locate, is a long-run
transfer of well-being from users of concrete to the small
number of individuals who, due to illiquid investments in
the land around potential concrete plant sites, are likely
to suffer if not compensated in the form of benefits made
available indirectly through the municipality's exaction
of a price for locating. In reducing the chance of a loss
to landowners who could have a plant move in near them and
not be able to recover, -- a risk uncertain as to who
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shall bear it but certain that some shall -- a rather
certain, very small, and highly spread out increase in
costs is imposed on users of concrete. This shift in
entitlement accomplishes something analogous to insurance
against the risk of land devaluation from environmental
impacts so marketed.
Such a distribution of entitlement would make it
more likely that plants would locate such that the loss
in surrounding land value is minimized. Whereas the
difficulties of multi-party bargaining might have prevented
the potentially adjacent landowners from bribing the plant
not to locate there, both because of the complexity of
dealing with a large number of surrounding landowners, and
the possibility of dealing with numerous concrete plant
developers, or owners of available sites, the existence
of bargaining power in the municipality as representative
of landowner interests insures that someone, albeit with
inferior valuation information, is in a position to bargain
with respect to the right to locate. In this way a market
for the environmental "externalities" of concrete plants
is created, and the "externality" -- the scarcity of the
non-profitably-marketable resource environmental amenity --
is "internalized". This is brought about through a
shift in the entitlement defining process, as well as
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the substance of landowners rights. An area of use entitle-
ment is now determined by municipal legislative bodies,
instead of through case by case nuisance adjudication
which, one expects, would have occasionally vested entitle-
ment to use land for concrete plant purposes without
compensating neighbors, in the owners of land. Competition
between municipalities, who for high enough prices will
accept the plant, rather than individual speculation on
the highly uncertain, highly particularized decision making
in nuisance litigation, will determine the location and
level of production of such large scale environmentally
detrimental facilities.
Where the coordination among municipal residents
involves the exclusion of a business use, it poses its
most serious problems in the centralized regulation of
internal affairs. This is largely because the values
penalized, concrete plant development and concrete use,
involve no concentrated impingement on the range of
opportunities open to any particular individuals or class.
The transfer of well-being involved in a municipal right
to exclude concrete plants, transfers costs essentially
to society at large. In the case of other excluded uses,
smaller amounts of the costs imposed by the exclusion can
be passed on to society. One must look to the nature of the
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use excluded. Where it is conveniently classified as a
production function, and does not as an activity serve
as the source of utility, the spreading of costs is likely
to be present. To the extent that the use excluded is
itself a source of utility, the transfer of well-being is
from the excluded users to the municipal residents.
Consider the exclusion of low income people from exclusive
residential suburbs. While it is true that the existence
of such a power to exclude would result in minimization
of the costs to suburban residents of living next to
poor people, the transfer of well-being involved, is from
the excluded classes themselves, since the function
penalized is not a production function and so provides no
means of passing on the cost to consumers of the goods
produced. It seems likely that such cases of exclusion
must be analyzed individually based on the illiquidity
of the sufferers of the impact and the consensus with
respect to the values involved.
What becomes apparent in this discussion is that the
coordination of internal land use by one municipality may
force surrounding municipalities to take similar action
if they are not to suffer a systematic increase in the
occurance of events which have disagreeable, though
differently priced, impacts. The people in the munici-
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palities surrounding Cresskill can no longer rely on
previously existing impediments to bargaining between
landowners which might have led to an acceptably random
distributinof heavy industry through the region. If
neither of these alternatives -- systematic increase in
disagreeable development or vesting in a representative
body a large amount of discretionary power which will
enable them to significantly affect the distribution
of wealth -- is acceptable, several alternative schemes
are available to police such municipal coordination. A
higher level regulatory scheme can be devised to allocate
to each municipality its "fair share" of regional develop-
ment, low income housing, industrial development, etc.
In order to escape increased centralized coordination of
municipal affairs, coordination can be escalated to a
higher level of government. Note that under such a scheme
there would be no need to regulate municipalities not
adopting a scheme of internal coordination. An alter-
native approach would selectively proscribe coordination
techniques of self-regulating municipalities. This is
analogous to inter-community nuisance. It requires
reliance on an adjudicatory body's ability to probe the
motive of political action, instead of on checks in the
political process itself. Bosselman suggests that the
Ramapo plan, which linked new development to an eighteen
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year capital budget for infrastructure improvements may
have been an instance of such a carefully disguised motive.23
The concerns which I earlier suggested were distinct
may now be seen as related. In each case the question
raised is whether individuals may retain their autonomy
without suffering a systematic increase in a certain type
of risk -- coordinating at a higher level to proscribe
local coordination -- or whether they must choose between
coordinating at the local level and bearing increased risk.
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Footnotes to Goals in Designing a Land Use Decision Process
1. Ellickson, Alternative to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules and Fines
as Land Use Controls, 40 U. Chicago L.R. 681 (1973)
"Allocation," "distribution," and "efficiency" are terms of art
with technical meanings to the economist that are not clear to the
uninitiated from an excerpt such as this. They are commonly used
in discussing a model of economic behavior involving interactions
among individuals over discreet periods of time. At the beginning
of each period, each individual has a certain amount of wealth. One
refers to the deployment of wealth at the beginning of the model as
the distribution. In the course of the interactions that ensue as the
model progresses, wealth is produced, consumed, and shifted
around. The shifting around is referred to as allocation.
When one speaks of distribution as an action or activity rather
than as the state one finds at the beginning of the model, one also
refers to changing the initial deployment of wealth, but for different
purposes than the shifting involved in allocation. It should be clear
that both distribution and allocation involve changing the deployment
of goods, services, rights, etc. among participants in the economy.
In the usual model, the distribution (state) is the deployment of
wealth one finds at the beginning of a period of the model, and
allocation is the shifting that goes on over the period. The distribution
one finds at the beginning of the next period is simply the deployment
one finds when the music stops.
2. Ellickson, 684. The subject of externalities and the limits of this
definition are considered in a subsequent section.
3. Ellickson, 684
4. See Mishan, Cost Benefit Analysis 109 - 113
5. Ellickson, 684
6. It is perhaps the efficacity and ready availability of procedures to
prevent the violation of rights, more than anything else, which
determines the level of collectivization of decision making.
7. I do not mean to suggest that Ellickson would quarrel with this
analysis. The differences I emphasize are more related to choice of
modeling alternatives than analytic correctness.
8. This is clear from his footnote 26.
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9. See e.g. Michelman.
There are also theoretical reasons for retaining a compensation
practice. The individual valuations which are the data for the
computations performed in application of the efficiency criteria are
based on the continued existance of a specific distribution of
wealth. That is, valuation by individuals is dependant upon their
wealth. That a starving man is willing to pay less for a new suit of
clothes than a rich man is clear. See Mishan, Pareto Optimality
and the Law and his chapter on the effect of legal liability in
Cost Benefit Analysis for an explanation of the effect this difference
in valuation may have in yielding apparantly paradoxical results.
Where these "welfare effects" are sufficiently large, it is possible
that the reversal of an efficient (uncompensated) transfer will also
be efficient.
10. Demsetz, Some Aspects of Property Rights
11. Mishan, Cost Benefit Analysis 108
12. 334 U.S. 1 (1948)
13. 492 P.2d 700
14. Ellickson, 684
15. Mishan, Cost Benefit Analysis 104
16. See the earlier discussion of robbery in the context of the Pareto
criterion.
17. 11 Ch. D 852 (1879)
18. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 44
19. Implicit in this suggestion is the assumption that valuation exists
apart from the values arrived at in the bargaining process. It seems
clear that in many situations a party would have been willing to pay
more, or accept less, and thus that this assumption bears a relation-
ship to the subjective valuation function to some extent. But it seems
equally clear that a party does not value an item before he conceives
of it, and that his taste for it may develop to a considerable extent
during the course of negotiations. It seems obvious that people may
be talked into wanting something that they had no particular desire
for previously. See also Heymann, 874 et seq on the non-instumental
- 117 -
values of bargaining.
The suggestion that individuals do not initiate negotiations
unless the expected returns exceed the expected costs would seem
still to apply. It must be recognized, however, that part of the costs
involved in negotiations may be investments in altering the other
parties' tastes, and some of the benefits derived, the utility of
negotiating itself.
20. See generally Demsetz, The Exchange and Enforcement of Property
Rights.
Mishan reacts critically to conclusions similar to these:
"By such reasoning, some economists found themselves perilously
close to the ultra-conservative conclusion that, in respect of
spillovers at least, what is, is best. For the rest, one could do
no more than to await the advent of innovations, technical or
institutional, which could reduce the costs of preventative devices
or the costs of negotiating and administration." Mishan, Cost
Benefit Analysis, 123. I find this reaction perplexing. Economists
do not conclude that what is is best in any ethical sense, but only
that it is "optimal" as that term is narrowly defined in terms of the
Pareto criterion. Perhaps it Is an implicit assumption that in the
real world distribution is as well defined as it is assumed to be
in economic modeling which leads Mishan to be critical of the
modeling deductions.
21. Cohen, Dialogue on Private Property 368-9
22. 1 N.J. 509
23. Bosselman, Can the Town of Ramapo Pass a Law to Bind the Whole
World?, 1 Florida State U. L.R. 234 (1973)
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